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R&D REPORTING BIASES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The immediate expensing of R&D expenditures is often justified by the conservatism 
principle. However, no accounting procedure consistently applied can be conservative 
throughout the firm’s life. We ask the following questions: (a) When is the expensing of 
R&D conservative and when is it aggressive, relative to R&D capitalization? and (b) 
What are the capital market implications of these reporting biases? To address these 
questions we construct a model of profitability biases (differences between reported 
profitability under R&D expensing and capitalization) and show that the key drivers of 
the reporting biases are the differences between R&D growth and earnings growth 
(momentum), and between R&D growth and return on equity (ROE). Companies with a 
high R&D growth rate relative to their profitability (typically early cycle companies) 
report conservatively, while firms with a low R&D growth rate (mature companies) tend 
to report aggressively under current GAAP. Our empirical analysis, covering the period 
1972-2003, generally supports the analytical predictions. 
 In the valuation analysis we find evidence consistent with investor fixation on the 
reported profitability measures: we detect undervaluation of conservatively reporting 
firms and overvaluation of aggressively reporting firms. These misvaluations appear to be 
corrected when the reporting biases reverse from conservative to aggressive and vice 
versa.
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R&D Reporting Biases and Their Consequences 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The immediate expensing of practically all internally-generated intangible investments in 
the U.S., a questionable procedure given the substantial future benefits of many such 
investments, is often justified by the conservatism principle.1  Conservative accounting 
procedures, goes the argument, counter managers' prevalent optimism,2 and are appropriate given 
the generally high level of uncertainty associated with the outcome of  intangible investments.3 
However, no accounting procedure consistently applied can be conservative (or aggressive) 
forever.  Over the lifetime of the enterprise, if reported earnings under a conservative accounting 
rule are understated (relative to a less conservative rule) during certain periods, they have to be 
overstated in other periods, given that conservative/aggressive accounting procedures essentially 
shift earnings from one period to another.  What then are the conditions under which the 
expensing of R&D (and other intangibles) will be conservative, or aggressive, relative to the 
capitalization of R&D?  And what are the capital market consequences, namely investors’ 
misvalutions of securities, of such conservative (understated earnings) or aggressive (overstated 
earnings) financial reporting? 
 We address these two questions in the current study.  We focus on three widely-used 
indicators of performance—the return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and earnings 
growth (momentum)—and derive the general conditions under which R&D expensing (the 
                                                 
1 The only exception in the U.S. to intangibles' expensing is the capitalization of some software development costs, 
required by SFAS 86.  For an empirical examination of software capitalizations, see Aboody and Lev (1998).  For a 
discussion of the evidence concerning R&D benefits, see Lev (1999). 
2 "Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a 
mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die."  (Keynes, 1936, pp. 161-162). 
3 Kothari et al. (2002) report that the earnings volatility associated with R&D is three times larger than that 
associated with tangible investment in property, plant and equipment. 
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current GAAP procedure) will result in overstated or understated values of these indicators, 
relative to capitalized R&D.  We then examine the validity of these general 
conservative/aggressive conditions on the sample data4.  Finally, we address the investor 
rationality question:  Is the conservative/aggressive reporting of enterprise profitability induced 
by the expensing of R&D, systematically affecting the pricing of securities?  That is, do 
investors properly perceive that over the life-cycle of the firm, a consistent application of R&D 
expensing will lead to understatement of profitability in certain periods, and overstatement in 
other periods?  Our empirical analysis, based on a comprehensive sample spanning 32 years 
(1972-2003), largely validates the general conditions derived analytically for R&D expensing to 
generate conservative or aggressive reporting.  With respect to investor rationality, we find 
systematic evidence of mispricing:  stocks of conservatively reporting firms are systematically 
undervalued, while those of aggressively reporting firms are overvalued.  Notably, these 
mispricings tend to be corrected when the reporting biases switch from conservative to 
aggressive, and vice versa.  These effects of an accounting practice  (R&D expensing) on 
investors’ valuations is distinct from previously established effects on valuation, such as those of 
firm size, book-to-market, and R&D intensity. 
 The accounting and finance literature includes extensive research related to our study.  
We note here our contribution relative to previous studies. Various studies have consistently 
documented a significant positive relationship between R&D intensity and subsequent stock 
returns (the R&D intensity effect), e.g. Lev and Sougiannis (1996), Chan et al. (2001), Chambers 
et al. (2002), Penman and Zhang (2002), Eberhard et al (2004). Explanations for the R&D 
intensity effect include both mispricing of R&D expenditures (Chan et al 2001, Eberhard et al 
                                                 
4 By aggressive reporting we do not mean that the companies “manage” or manipulate their reported earnings.  
Rather, following the full expensing of R&D mandated by GAAP results in an overstatement of the change in 
earnings, relative to the capitalization of R&D. 
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2004), and risk premium (Chambers et al. 2002) arguments. We demonstrate below that in 
addition to the R&D intensity effect, there is a significant reporting profitability bias effect, 
namely firms that report conservative profitability and earnings growth (relative to same 
indicators under R&D capitalization) are undervalued, while firms that report aggressive 
profitability and earnings growth are overvalued. These over/under valuations are distinct from 
the effects of R&D intensity on subsequent returns, demonstrated in previous studies.  
Interestingly, our reporting-related misvaluations are corrected when the reporting biases reverse 
from conservative to aggressive and vice versa.  Our contribution thus lies in identifying a 
distinct, and particularly relevant to accounting source of capital market misvaluations—
reporting biases due to R&D expensing.5    
Our analytical model contributes to the literature by developing a unified structure of 
reported profitability biases arising from alternative accounting rules, and documenting 
empirically the presence of such biases in the sample data. The fact that the immediate expensing 
of growing expenditures such as R&D, results in conservative reporting, whereas the expensing 
of shrinking expenditures results in aggressive reporting is a standard feature of accounting 
research and financial statement analysis, e.g. Beaver and Ryan (2000), Monahan (1999), 
Danielson and Press (2004). However, the rate of growth at which conservative accounting tips 
over into aggressive reporting depends as our model shows on the particular profitability 
measure used. We add to prior studies by outlining the cutoff points for conservative/aggressive 
reporting for three key profitability measures, ROE, ROA and earnings growth, or momentum. 
                                                 
5 Our evidence complements the evidence reported by Luft and Shields (2001) who use an experimental setting in 
which the subjects are MBA students. Evidence from the experiment indicates that when individuals use information 
on intangible expenditures to predict profits, expensing the expenditures (versus capitalizing) significantly reduces 
the accuracy, consistency, consensus, and self-insight of individuals’ subjective profit predictions. The authors point 
out that consistent with psychological theories of learning, individuals do not learn the exact magnitude of the effect 
of intangibles on future profits as well when the intangibles are expensed. The study implies that decisions based on 
the expensing of intangibles may lead to mistakes. We confirm with actual data that indeed investors appear to make 
mistakes, given the expensing of R&D. In addition, our evidence provides further support to behavioral finance 
arguments about investor irrationality, e.g. Barberis and Thaler (2003).  
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We then use the cutoff points to carry out empirical analyses that generate new insights on the 
R&D expensing versus capitalizing controversy.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we construct a model that 
allows us to identify the drivers of profitability reporting biases, and derive testable hypotheses 
for the existence and consequences of the biases. In Section 3 we discuss data sources and 
variable definitions. In Section 4 we validate the model by comparing its predictions to the 
sample reporting biases. In Section 5 we test the capital market consequences of the biases. 
Section 6 contains concluding remarks.  
 
2. Conservative and Aggressive Reporting Under R&D Expensing 
We derive in this section the general conditions under which the expensing of R&D will 
generate conservative (understated) or aggressive (overstated) performance measures, relative to 
performance measured under the capitalization and amortization of R&D.  We do not prescribe 
in this study the capitalization or expensing of R&D, or other intangibles.  Rather, we postulate 
that if R&D expenditures have under certain circumstances future benefits, their immediate 
expensing will lead to systematic performance reporting biases, relative to underlying earnings 
under R&D capitalization.  Our interest here is in deriving general rules for identifying such 
biases. 
The analytical results are derived under an assumption of steady R&D growth, captured 
through an exogenous parameter, g. Assume that a firm has an initial expenditure C of R&D in 
year 1 and that R&D grows at a rate g per year. Thus, the R&D expenditure in year t would be 
C(1+g)t. The issue we address is the comparison of profitability indicators when the firm 
expenses R&D expenditure in year t as opposed to capitalizing and amortizing it over T years 
(under the assumption that cash flows are unaffected by the accounting policy and that other 
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reporting choices are unchanged).  We assume that under the expensing method, the firm has in 
year t earnings of Et and book value of equity (respectively, assets) of BVEt (BVAt). Our 
analysis relates to years t > T, that is, after a full R&D amortization cycle is complete. Only in 
this case can meaningful comparisons be made between expensing and capitalizing policies.  
It is important to note, at least from a theoretical perspective, that the results derived in 
this section can also be obtained in two more complex settings. The first is where R&D 
investment determines earnings growth. The second is where there are multiple assets with 
depreciation calculated on a continuous basis. We do not report those results mainly because 
they do not lead to any significant changes in our empirical tests. However, it is worth noting 
that each of these settings generates empirical predictions that may be a potential area of future 
research.6  
Notation: 
Et  =  Earnings in year t under expensing of R&D, 
c
tE  =  Earnings in year t under capitalization and amortization of R&D, 
BVAt (BVEt) = Book value of assets (equity) at end of year t under expensing of R&D, 
 
BVAtc ( ctBVE ) = Book value of assets (equity) at end of year t under capitalization and 
amortization of R&D, 
 
EMt )(EMct    = Earnings growth from year t-1 to t  (momentum) under expensing (capitalization) 
of R&D. 
 
T = Amortization period of R&D investment (for capitalizing firms), 
g = Annual growth rate of R&D expenditures, 
C = R&D expenditure in year 1, 
τ = Tax Rate, 
                                                 
6 Results are available from the authors on request. 
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 We focus in the following analysis on three widely used measures of operating 
performance:  return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and the earnings growth 
(momentum). 
 
Proposition 1 [ROA, ROE and Non Zero R&D Growth Rate] 
The R&D expensing firm reports a higher ROA than the capitalizing firm if and only if:  
g
2
1+1
g )  - 1 ( ROA τ≥  .    The analogous result for ROE is .g/2)+g/(1  ROE ≥  
 
Proof: See Appendix  
 
Proposition 2 [Earnings Momentum and R&D Growth Rate] 
 
The R&D expensing firm reports a higher earnings growth rate (EM) than the capitalizing firm if 
and only if g  EM t ≥ . That is, an expensing policy results in a higher reported earnings 
momentum if and only if the growth of R&D expenditures is slow relative to the reported (under 
expensing) earnings growth. 
Proof:  See Appendix A 
A qualification to the preceding propositions concerns the underlying assumption that 
earnings are positive and higher under capitalization than under expensing (see Appendix A). For 
instance, Proposition 2 fails if Et > Etc > 0. Similarly, Proposition 1 depends on a steady growth 
in R&D over the entire amortization period and may fail if growth is uneven.7 
                                                 
7 A real-life example of such aggressive reporting of ROE is provided by Lev and Sougiannis (1996, Appendix) for 
Merck & Co.  In 1991 Merck's annual R&D growth rate was 15.7%, substantially lower than reported ROE (0.55).  
Our model (above) suggests that in this case (where ROE > g/((1+g/2)), the return on equity under capitalization of 
R&D will be lower than ROE under expensing.  This, indeed, is the case for Merck: ROE under capitalization was 
0.40 in 1991, compared with a reported ROE of 0.55. Further, Merck’s reported 3-year earnings change in 1991 
(relative to 1988) was 76%.  This growth rate is higher than the 1991 (3-year) R&D growth rate (47.7%), and our 
model predicts that in this case the reported momentum will be higher (aggressive reporting) than the earnings 
momentum under R&D capitalization.  This, indeed, is the case: The 1991 (3-year) momentum under R&D 
capitalization is 70%, while the reported momentum is 76%. 
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 Given the expensing rule for R&D expenditures mandated by SFAS 2, our above 
propositions lead us directly to the following testable hypotheses: 
H1: Let g denote the R&D growth rate. If [g/(1 + g/2)] is greater (less) than reported 
ROE then ROE under R&D capitalization is greater (less) than ROE under expensing of 
R&D. 
 
H2: When the R&D growth rate is greater (less) than earnings growth under R&D 
expensing then earnings growth under capitalization is greater (less) than earnings growth 
under R&D expensing. 
 
We thus established cut-off rules indicating when reported profitability will be 
conservative (reported ROE, ROA, and earnings growth lower than under capitalization), and 
when reported profitability is aggressive (reported indicators higher than under capitalization). 
 In addition, our propositions imply that under the current expensing rule, understanding 
the relationship between R&D investment growth and profitability is important for stock market 
valuation purposes. In theory, market value should be based on economic profitability, and any 
distortions of economic profitability measures due to the application of economically 
inconsistent accounting rules could lead to stock market misvaluations if investors fixate on 
reported profitability. For example, for firms with R&D growth rate sufficiently large relative to 
reported profitability, undervaluation is possible because the effects on income outweigh the 
asset-reduction resulting from leaving the R&D asset off the balance sheet. However, even if the 
market fixates on reported profitability, it cannot undervalue assets forever. The reason is that a 
point in time comes at which the difference between reported and economic profitability (the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 -8- 
reporting bias) reverses. In our setting, this happens when the R&D growth rate drops below the 
cutoff value indicated in Proposition 1. At that point investors should be taking the appropriate 
action to correct any prior misvaluation. This reasoning leads us to the following testable 
hypotheses: 
H3: Firms with R&D growth rate g, such that  [g/(1 + g/2)] is greater (less) than reported 
ROE, are undervalued (overvalued) and this misvaluation is corrected when the R&D 
growth rate drops below the cutoff 2ROE/(2- ROE).  
 
H4: Stocks with R&D growth rate greater (less) than reported earnings momentum are 
undervalued (overvalued), and this misvaluation is corrected when the R&D growth rate 
becomes less (greater) than reported earnings momentum.  
 
The importance of systematic misvaluations, if present, is that they may lead to social 
harm.  Systematic undervaluations, for example, imply an excessively high cost of capital, which 
in turn hinders investment and growth. Conversely, overvaluations lead to undesirable wealth 
transfers from outside investors to insiders, given the considerable information asymmetries 
associated with R&D.8 The remaining of the paper empirically tests the above four hypotheses.  
 
3. Data and Measures 
 Our sources of data are the Compustat and CRSP databases. We use data for the period 
1972 to 2003, and include in our samples all firms with valid data in the Compustat Active and 
Research files for the following variables: sales (item no. 12), R&D expenditures (item no. 46), 
book value of common equity (item no. 60), and net income (item no. 172). Market value of 
                                                 
8 Indeed, Aboody and Lev (2000) report that insider gains in R&D-intensive companies are substantially higher than 
in firms with no (or low) R&D. 
 
 -9- 
common equity (price per share times number of shares outstanding), and stock returns are 
derived from the CRSP Stock Return files.  
For each firm we compute the annual amortization of R&D (distinct from the R&D 
expenditure which is expensed in the financial report) as well as the R&D capital calculated 
from the time-series of reported R&D expenses (Compustat item no. 46).  The R&D 
amortization and capital values are used to derive earnings and book values under R&D 
capitalization by adjusting both the reported earnings (Compustat item no. 172) and book values 
of equity (Compustat item no. 60). Firm-specific estimates of R&D amortization are generally 
too noisy and unreliable, given the relatively short time series of R&D available and the high 
serial correlation of annual R&D expenditures for most firms.  Industry-specific amortization 
rates, such as those estimated by Lev and Sougiannis (1996) are more reliable.  For this study, 
encompassing all Compustat companies with R&D data, we adopt a uniform R&D amortization 
rate of 20% per year.9  Accordingly, the R&D amortization in year t (RDAt) is 20% of all the 
previous R&D expenditures (vintages) which are still productive (i.e., not fully amortized): 
RDAit = 0.2 * (RDit-1 + RDit-2 + RDit-3 + RDit-4 + RDit-5).   (1) 
The R&D capital at the end of year t (RDCt) is the sum of the unamortized R&D 
expenditures (vintages) which are still productive: 
RDCit = .RD2.0RD4.0RD6.0RD8.0RD 4321 −−−− ×+×+×+×+ ititititit  (2)  
 Table 1 provides summary statistics of our sample. The data indicate that R&D 
expenditures have grown sharply over time. As a percentage of sales, R&D expenditures were 
1.70%, on average, in 1975 and more than doubled by 2000 to 4.54%. It is also interesting to 
note that as a percentage of earnings, R&D expenditures have grown from 36.1% in 1975 to 
96.9% in 2000. Since firms' R&D expenditures have generally increased over time, the annual 
                                                 
9 Uniform rates are frequently used in economic research (e.g., the 15% rate assumed in Hall et al., 1988). 
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R&D amortization is smaller than the annual accounting expense, as indicated by the lower R&D 
intensity ratios based on R&D capitalization than those based on R&D expensing.  The data in 
Table 1 also show that R&D capital represents a relatively large intangible asset, accounting for 
25% of the book value of equity in 2000, even with our assumed fast amortization rate of R&D 
(20% per year).  
Table 2 presents data on the growth rate of R&D, the growth rate (momentum) of 
earnings, and return on equity -- three key variables in our study.  The growth rates of R&D and 
earnings are computed over five years: [R&D (or earnings)t - R&D (or earnings)t-4]/R&D (or 
earnings)t-4. When earningst-4 is negative we use their absolute value in the denominator.10 Table 
2 presents data for the most R&D-intensive industries and for selected years. For practically all 
industries (except pharmaceuticals), the 5-year growth rate of R&D plummeted in 1990, relative 
to 1985 (e.g., from 124.8% to 31.4% in software), perhaps induced by the onset of the recession 
in the US in the early 1990s and by the maturing of several industries.  In a few industries 
(software, transportation), R&D growth picked up in the early 1990s and by 2000 there are signs 
of higher growth in all industries reported except drugs and pharmaceuticals.11    
 The earnings growth patterns (middle three columns in Table 2) portray a different 
picture than the R&D growth.  The earnings growth of pharmaceutical companies decreased over 
the examined period, while their R&D growth was largely constant, perhaps due to HMO and 
Medicare/Medicaid pressure on drug prices and usage in the 1990s.  In contrast, the earnings 
growth rate of computers, measuring instruments, transportation equipment and electrical 
equipment companies soared in the first half of the 1990s, despite flat or decreasing growth rates 
of R&D in those industries. However, in the second half of the 1990s the earnings growth rates 
                                                 
10 We also used a three-year growth rate calculation. The empirical results are almost identical to those reported 
below. 
11 A recent report by the Council on Competitiveness, written by Porter and Stern (Porter and Stern 1999), strongly 
warns about dangers to U.S. competitiveness from decreases in the growth rate of R&D, particularly basic research. 
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of these industries have declined substantially. In particular, a growth rate of 8.8% for computers 
reflects the strong competition in the industry. Communications companies exhibited at the 
median, a negative earnings growth in the early 1990s, probably as a result of the extensive 
deregulation in this industry (e.g., the opening up of intrastate phone service to competition), but 
they seem to be recovering in the late 1990s.   
 Median return on equity (ROE) values vary across years and industries with the most 
stable pattern exhibited by transportation. In year 2000, four out of seven industries had negative 
median ROEs and apparently software and drug companies suffered large losses.  
 Considering the main variables driving our analysis, almost two thirds of the sample 
firm-years (62.4%) had an R&D growth rate which was higher than the earnings momentum, 
leading according to our model to conservative reporting of earnings growth and to potential 
market under-valuation. In the remaining one third (37.6%) of the sample cases, the R&D 
growth rate was lower than the earnings momentum, leading to an aggressive earnings growth 
reporting and to potential market over-valuation.  In 61% of the firm-years, R&D growth was 
higher than ROE, leading according to our model to conservative ROE reporting with potential 
market under-valuation, and aggressive reporting in the remaining 39% of the cases with 
potential market over-valuation.  
 
4. Validating the Model's Predictions 
 
 In this section we examine the empirical support for our hypotheses H1 and H2 derived 
from propositions 1 and 2 in Section 2. Using the notation, RDG(5) for the five-year R&D 
growth rate, RDG for the annual R&D growth rate, ROE for the reported (R&D-expensed) return 
on equity, ROEC for the R&D-capitalized ROE, EM(5) for the five-year reported earnings 
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growth (momentum), and EM(5)C for the five-year earnings momentum under R&D capitization, 
we restate our two hypotheses as follows:  
H1: If {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} > ROE then ROE < ROEC, and the converse for 
{RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}< ROE. Namely, if the growth rate of R&D divided by 1 plus half 
the R&D growth rate is larger than the firm’s ROE under expensing, then that ROE will 
be conservative (lower than ROE under R&D capitalization). 
H2: If RDG(5) > EM(5) then EM(5) < EM(5)C, and the converse for RDG(5) < EM(5). Namely, 
if the five-year growth rate of R&D is larger than the five-year growth rate of reported 
earnings under R&D expensing, then reported earnings growth is conservative (lower 
than reported earnings growth under R&D capitalization). 
 
 Since these relationships are not linear, we use a portfolio approach to examine their 
validity and then also employ a regression approach.  We implement two alternative variations of 
the portfolio approach. In the first, sample companies with valid data were ranked in each year 
into nine portfolios, in decreasing sizes of RDG(5) and EM(5) (and alternatively in decreasing 
sizes of {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} and ROE).  Thus, sample firms were first classified in each year 
into three portfolios based on decreasing size of earnings momentum, EM(5), and then within 
each of the three EM(5) portfolios firms were classified into three decreasing R&D growth, 
RDG(5), portfolios.  The same procedure was applied to the R&D growth and return on equity 
indicators, yielding nine size-ranked {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} and ROE portfolios.  In each of the 
nine RDG(5)-EM(5) portfolios, and the nine {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE portfolios we focus on 
the reporting biases, in earnings growth (momentum) and ROE, namely the differences between 
reported (R&D expensed) and R&D-capitalized earnings momentum, EM(5) - EM(5)C, and 
between reported and R&D-capitalized ROE, ROE - ROEC. 
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In the second variation of the portfolio tests we control for R&D intensity, measured by 
the R&D expenditures to sales ratio.12 This is a more demanding test than the above because it 
controls not only for R&D growth but also for R&D intensity (level of the expenditure), which is 
likely to affect the size of the reporting bias in ROE and earnings momentum. In this test, sample 
companies with valid data were ranked in each year into nine portfolios, in decreasing sizes of 
RDG(5)-EM(5) and R&D-to-sales (and alternatively in decreasing sizes of 
{RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and R&D-to-sales). Thus, sample firms were first classified in each 
year into three portfolios based on decreasing size of RDG(5)-EM(5), and then within each of the 
three RDG(5)-EM(5) portfolios firms were classified into three decreasing R&D-to-sales (RDS) 
portfolios.  The same procedure was applied to the R&D growth and return on equity 
relationship, yielding nine size-ranked {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and R&D-to-sales portfolios. 
Table 3 presents data for the relationship between annualized R&D growth, 
{RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}, and return on equity, ROE, based on the second test (including R&D 
intensity).13 We expect (H1) that when {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} is larger than reported ROE, the 
latter will be smaller than ROE under R&D capitalization, (namely, conservative reporting), and 
vice versa for {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} < ROE.  This indeed is the case in the High 
{RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and High RDS portfolio (left-most column): The mean R&D growth 
{RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} is (0.45), or 45%, and is substantially larger than the mean reported ROE  
(-1.266), which in turn is smaller (conservative reporting) than the R&D-capitalized ROE          
(-0.223). In the case of Low {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and High RDS portfolio (third from the 
right-most column), the mean R&D growth {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} is (0.042), or 4.2%, and is 
substantially lower than the mean reported ROE (1.343), which in turn is larger (aggressive 
reporting) than the R&D-capitalized ROE (0.455). Thus, in each of the nine portfolios, the 
                                                 
12 We thank a reviewer for this suggestion. 
13 Results based on the first variation are very similar to those reported in Table 3 and are available upon request.   
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empirical relationship between the reported and R&D-capitalized ROEs is consistent with 
proposition 1's prediction and the related hypothesis H1. To abstract from extreme observations, 
we also computed median values (reported in squared brackets in Table 3).  Examination of the 
medians indicates that the expected relationships (reporting biases) hold at the medians too.  
The mean and median differences between reported and R&D-capitalized ROE are 
presented in the row labeled “Reported ROE minus R&D-capitalized ROE” with t-statistics in 
parentheses. All the mean differences but one are significantly different from zero. However, 
only four out of the nine median differences are significantly different from zero. These 
significance tests imply that many of the reporting biases are driven by extreme cases.  
 The remaining data in Table 3 show that high R&D growth firms are characterized by the 
lowest book-to-market ratios, reflecting investors' strong growth expectations from high R&D 
growth companies.  These firms are also characterized by relatively low earnings-to-price ratios, 
particularly pronounced at the medians.  This reflects the depressed reported earnings of these 
firms as a result of the expensing of R&D.  High R&D growth firms also tend to have high R&D 
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intensity.  The differences between the mean and the median firm sizes in each portfolio are 
large, indicating the existence of very large firms in each portfolio.14 
Table 4 presents data for the relationship between R&D growth and earnings momentum 
(growth) for nine RDG(5)-EM(5) and R&D-to-sales ranked portfolios, including control for 
R&D intensity. As in the R&D growth and ROE analysis (Table 3), sample firms were first 
ranked into high, medium, and low five-year R&D growth minus five-year earnings momentum, 
RDG(5)-EM(5), portfolios, and then within each of those portfolios into high, medium and low 
R&D-to-sales portfolios. We expect (H2) that when RDG(5) is larger than reported EM(5), the 
latter will be smaller than EM(5)C, and vice versa for RDG (5) < EM(5).  This indeed is the case 
in the High RDG(5)-EM(5) and the High RDS portfolio (left-most column), where the mean 
five-year R&D growth RDG(5) of 2.771 (277.1% over five years) is substantially larger than the 
mean reported five-year earnings change EM(5) of -7.792, which in turn is smaller (conservative 
reporting) than R&D-capitalized earnings momentum, EM(5)C, of -6.434. In the case of Low 
                                                 
14 Based on a reviewer’s comment we also allowed for the possibility of a disproportionate R&D growth in the early 
years of the five-year period over which R&D growth is measured. Thus, if in the first two years R&D growth is 
very high relative to the last three years, the current ROE may not reflect the expected amount of bias. To alleviate 
this concern we used a five-year ROE calculated as: 
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, where E is reported 
earnings (Compustat item no. 172), D is common dividends (Compustat item no. 21), BVE is book value of equity 
(Compustat item # 60), and R is 1 plus the average discount rate of 12%. The numerator is cum-dividend aggregate 
earnings over the five-year horizon, i.e. it also includes earnings from the reinvestment of dividends and thus 
consistent with Ohlson (1995). We formed portfolios by ranking firms on five-year R&D growth minus five-year 
ROE, [RDG(5) - ROE(5)], and R&D-to-sales. The results, available upon request, are very similar to those reported 
in Table 3: the predicted relationship is still present but the significance of the reporting bias is lower. 
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RDG(5)-EM(5) and medium RDS portfolio (second from the right-most column), the mean five-
year R&D growth of 0.504, (50.4% over five years) is substantially lower than the mean reported 
five-year earnings change EM(5) of 7.337, which in turn is larger (aggressive reporting) than the 
five-year earnings change under R&D capitalization of 6.872. Thus, our model’s predictions 
regarding the cut-off rates for conservative/aggressive reporting of earnings growth and ROE, 
are validated by the data. 
The data in Table 4 show that the differences between the mean reported earnings 
momentum and the momentum under R&D capitalization are in all but two portfolios in the 
expected direction (the Medium RDG(5)-EM(5) - Low RDS, and the Low RDG(5)-EM(5)  - 
High RDS portfolios are in the opposite direction, perhaps due to outliers). Median values 
(reported in squared brackets in Table 4) exhibit similar patterns to the means. Thus, the 
empirical relationship between the reported and R&D-capitalized earnings momentum is 
generally consistent with proposition 2's prediction and thus with hypothesis H2. However, the 
mean differences between reported and R&D-capitalized earnings changes (reported in the row 
labeled “Reported earnings momentum minus R&D-capitalized earnings momentum”) are 
significant in only two of the nine portfolios (t-statistics in parentheses). None of the median 
differences between reported and R&D-capitalized earnings changes are significant. Thus, 
although the expected patterns are present in the data, the reporting bias in earnings momentum, 
unlike the bias in ROE, is not material.15 A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 reveals that mean and 
median differences between reported and R&D capitalized earnings momentum, given R&D 
growth and R&D intensity (Table 4) are larger than the differences between reported and R&D-
                                                 
15 We also run the momentum analysis using the first variation of the portfolio approach, i.e. initially classifying 
firms into three EM(5) portfolios and then within each EM(5) portfolio firms were classified into three R&D growth 
portfolios. The results of this analysis, available upon request, are stronger than those reported in Table 4, i.e. 
differences between reported and R&D-capitalized earnings changes in all nine portfolios are in the expected 
direction. However, only three mean and median differences are significantly different from zero. 
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capitalized ROE (Table 3). The reason apparently lies in the larger effect of R&D capitalization 
on a change indicator (earnings momentum) than on a levels measure (ROE).16 
 Summarizing, our analyses validate the predictions of our propositions and provide 
empirical support for the related hypotheses H1 and H2: differences between R&D growth rates 
and key profitability measures (earnings momentum and ROE) lead to systematic reporting 
biases in the profitability measures.  In general, companies with high R&D growth rate relative 
to their profitability (often emerging industries, such as biotech, and young companies), report 
conservatively, while low R&D growth companies (mature firms) report aggressively.  The 
analysis also indicates that the reporting biases are substantially larger for the earnings 
momentum than for the return on equity. Thus, the widely held view that the expensing of 
intangible investments generally leads to conservative profitability reporting is a misconception. 
At the same time the analysis reveals that the reporting bias in ROE is statistically significant in 
most portfolios while the reporting bias in the earnings momentum (growth) is statistically 
insignificant in most portfolios. Evidently, the cross-sectional variability of the earnings 
momentum bias is larger than that of the ROE bias. We now turn to the question:  What, if any, 
are the effects of reporting biases (conservative/aggressive reporting) on investors’ valuations? 
 
                                                 
16 Despite the nonlinearities in the theoretical relationships between the key variables (R&D growth and 
profitability measures), we also carried out a regression analysis of reporting biases. Specifically, we regressed for 
the pooled sample (with time and industry dummy variables) the reporting bias, namely the difference between the 
firm's reported and R&D-capitalized earnings momentum, i.e. EM(5) - EM(5)C, on the theoretical driver of the bias -
the difference between R&D growth and reported earnings momentum, i.e. RDG(5)-EM(5). Additional independent 
variables are the squared difference between RDG(5) and EM(5) (to capture some nonlinearities), log firm size, and 
R&D intensity, RDS. A similar regression was run for R&D growth and ROE, namely ROE - ROEC (the ROE 
reporting bias), regressed on the following variables: {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE, ({RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE)2 , 
log firm size, R&D intensity, and time and industry dummy variables. The estimated coefficients of the "drivers of 
reporting biases," namely RDG(5)-EM(5) and {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE  are negative and highly significant,        
(-0.852, t= -42.74) and (-0.441, t= -68.95), respectively. These coefficients indicate that when the R&D growth rate 
is larger than the earnings momentum, reported momentum tends to become smaller than R&D-capitalized 
momentum (conservatism bias), and vice versa for R&D growth below the earnings momentum (an aggressive bias). 
Similarly, as predicted by the model, for R&D growth above ROE, reported ROE will fall short of R&D-capitalized 
ROE (conservative bias).  
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5. The Valuation Consequences of Reporting Biases 
 
 
5.1 Methodology 
 In this section we examine hypotheses H3 and H4, namely whether the reporting biases 
lead to stock market misvaluations.  For this we again employ both regression and portfolio 
analyses. Our regression methodology is similar to the one used by Lev and Sougiannis (1996) 
who follow Fama and French (1992) by relating stock returns to lagged values of fundamental 
variables. In particular,  Fama and French (1992) regressed stock returns on lagged values of the 
following fundamentals: systematic risk (β), firm size (market capitalization), the book-to-
market ratio, financial leverage, and the earnings-to-price ratio. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) 
added to these variables an R&D intensity measurethe R&D capital-to-market ratioand 
found its coefficient to be positive and highly significant. In this study we add to the model yet 
another variable relating to the reporting bias in ROE or earnings momentum. We use the 
variables {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and RDG(5)-EM(5) directly in the regression and we also 
construct bias score variables as suggested by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Thus, we estimate the 
following cross-sectional regression: 
 
R i,t+j = c 0,j + c 1,j β i,t + c 2,jln(M) i,t + c 3,j ln(B/M) i,t + c 4,j ln(A/B) i,t 
             + c 5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +  c 6,j (E/M dummy) i,t + c 7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t  
             + c 8,j (ROE or EM bias score) i,t + e i,t+j.                                           (3) 
Where: 
Ri,t+j = returns: monthly stock returns of firm i, starting with the 7th month after fiscal t 
year-end, j = 1,…..,84,  
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βi,t = risk: CAPM-based beta of firm i, estimated from 60 monthly stock returns up to 
month t (one month preceding the return calculation); a minimum of 24 months is 
required,  
Mi,t = size: market value of firm i, calculated as price times number of shares 
outstanding at t, the beginning of the returns calculation period, 
(B/M)i,t = book-to-market: ratio of book value of common equity (Compustat item no. 60) 
plus balance sheet deferred taxes (Compustat item no. 74) to market value of 
equity of firm i at fiscal year-end (Compustat item no. 199 times item no. 25), 
(A/B)i,t = leverage: ratio of book value of total assets (Compustat item no. 6) to book 
value of common equity of firm i at fiscal year-end, 
[E(+)/M]i,t = earnings/price ratio: ratio of positive earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat item no. 18) plus income statement deferred taxes (Compustat item 
no. 50) minus preferred dividends (Compustat item no. 19), to the market value of 
common equity of firm i at fiscal year-end; this variable is set equal to 0 when 
earnings are negative, 
(E/M dummy)i,t = 1 if earnings of firm i for fiscal t are negative, and 0 otherwise,  
 (RDC/M)i,t = R&D capital: estimated R&D capital [expression (2)] over market value of 
equity at fiscal year-end, 
(ROE bias score)i,t = ROE bias score: scaled decile rank of ({RDGit/[(RDGit/2)+1]} minus 
ROEit), constructed by ranking the values of this difference into deciles (0,9) each 
year t and dividing the decile number by nine, so that each firm i takes on a decile 
rank value ranging between zero and one in each year t. The ranking is on an 
ascending order and thus firms with the most negative  ({RDGit/[(RDGit/2)+1]} 
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minus ROEit) values are assigned the score of zero while firms with the most 
positive ({RDGit/[(RDGit/2)+1]} minus ROEit) values are assigned the score of 1.  
(EM bias score)i,t = Earnings Momentum bias score: scaled decile rank of (RDG(5)it – EM(5)it), 
constructed by ranking the values of this difference into deciles (0,9) each year t 
and dividing the decile number by nine, so that each firm i takes on a decile rank 
value ranging between zero and one in each year t. The ranking is on an ascending 
order and thus firms with the most negative RDG(5)it – EM(5)it values are 
assigned the score of zero while firms with the most positive RDG(5)it – EM(5)it 
values are assigned the score of 1.17  
 
The following time-line clarifies the regressions (3): 
    Subsequent returns 
     t         F/S       t+1  t+2 t+3     t+4       t+5  t+6    t+7 
|           | |     |        |         |             |     |          |    | 
1         12 18   30      42       54  66   78        90  102 
The accounting fundamentals – book value, earnings, total assets, R&D expenditures, R&D 
capital, R&D growth, ROE and earnings momentum – pertain to fiscal year t (months 1-12 in the 
time line). Six months (13-18) are then allowed to pass for the public disclosure of fiscal t annual 
financial statements by all sample firms, followed by 12 first-year monthly stock returns, Ri,t+j 
(months 19-30), ending up with 12 seventh-year monthly stock returns (months 90-102). For the 
R&D growth minus the ROE analysis we have 21 years of portfolio formation (1975-1995) and 
we estimate regression (3) cross-sectionally for each of the subsequent 84 return months. Thus, 
                                                 
17 In additional analyses we use directly the bias variable in the regression instead of the score variable. The results 
are similar to those reported but slightly weaker. We also use a score variable for R&D intensity, i.e. we have both 
an R&D intensity score variable and a bias driving score variable. Again, our inferences do not change significantly. 
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in total, 1,764 cross-sectional regressions were estimated (21 years x 84 regressions per year). 
For the R&D growth minus the earnings momentum analysis we have 17 years of portfolio 
formation (1979-1995), since we need five years to construct EM(5), and we estimate regression 
(3) cross-sectionally for each of the subsequent 84 return months. Thus, in total, 1,428 cross-
sectional regressions were estimated (17 years x 84 regressions per year). For this analysis we 
obtained stock returns, stock prices and shares outstanding from the CRSP monthly files. The 
portfolio analysis is further explained below. 
 
5.2 Regression analysis:  ROE Biases 
 Table 5 reports mean coefficient estimates of regression (3) for the R&D growth minus 
ROE analysis. Panel A reports results for subsequent years 1, 3, 5, and 7 for regression (3) 
without the bias score variable. This benchmark regression gives results very similar to those 
reported by Lev and Sougiannis (1996 and 1999), and Penman and Zhang (2002) who used it for 
a horizon up to two years ahead. Here we extend the horizon to seven years ahead and it is 
interesting to note that the only variable that is highly significant (1% level) consistently in all 
years is the R&D intensity variable (RDC/M). Thus, the ability of R&D intensity to predict 
returns is a rather long run phenomenon. This evidence provides support for the risk explanation 
of the R&D intensity effect.18  
 Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of regression (3) when the R&D growth minus 
ROE bias score is included as an independent variable. The significance of R&D intensity 
(RDC/M) is not diminished, but the bias score variable is significantly negative in year 1 
(-0.0031, t= -2.602). Given the construction of the bias score variable, this result indicates that 
firms with R&D growth greater than ROE (for which the score is 1) in year t earn negative 
                                                 
18 The size and book-to-market  (B/M) coefficients have signs consistent with those reported in prior studies, 
negative for size and positive for B/M, but they are significant only in the early years.   
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abnormal returns in the next year (t+1). This is an unexpected result because such firms are 
predicted by our model to be undervalued: their expensing of R&D leads to conservative 
reporting, as shown above.19 Thus, the expectation was to see a significantly positive coefficient 
at t+1. The significantly negative coefficient implies that any undervaluation due to the reporting 
bias at t continues at t+1. The question then is: when is this mispricing corrected? Clearly, the 
correction should manifest in positive bias score coefficients (positive returns) in future years. 
The panel reports that for year t+3 the coefficient is still negative but not significant. However, 
the coefficient, although insignificant, reverses sign to positive in year 4 (not reported), remains 
positive in year 5 (reported) and continues to be positive in years 6 (not reported) and 7 
(reported). In fact, the sum of the coefficients over the seven year horizon is only -0.0001 (-
0.00421 in the first three years and 0.0041 in the last four years).  
 These results suggest that any mispricing caused by the reporting R&D-related bias is 
corrected for different firms at different times, namely the correction spreads over several years. 
The remaining panels, C to H, in Table 5 provide corroborating evidence. In panel C we report 
results based on the inclusion of the change in the bias score in regression (3). The reasoning is 
that when the bias driving variable (RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} minus ROE) changes (sufficiently for 
the decile score to change), the market notices the change and takes the appropriate action. 
Indeed, the significance of the bias score coefficient decreases from the 1% level in panel B to 
the 5% level in panel C. The change in the bias score coefficient is positive in both reported 
years 1 and 2 implying that a correction is taking place. However, the evidence is not strong 
given the small magnitude and insignificance of this coefficient (0.0009, t=0.570 in year t+1). 
This leads us to focus on the most pronounced changes, the reversals, in the bias driving variable 
                                                 
19 We carried out a variety of tests that focused on the level of the bias driving variable or the bias score variable, 
such as examining the behavior of extreme bias score deciles. Those tests did not yield any insights because, as is 
demonstrated below, it is not the level but the change in the bias that is relevant for the analysis. 
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(RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} minus ROE). The reason is that when the bias driving variable reverses 
sign investors notice it and take the appropriate action that corrects the mispricing.  
 We test this conjecture by explicitly controlling in regression (3) for reversals in the bias 
driving variable. In particular, we identify firms for which the bias driving variable reversed 
from positive in year t-1 to negative in year t, and from negative in year t-1 to positive in year t. 
The bias scores for these two groups of firms are added as two additional explanatory variables 
in regression (3) and their coefficients capture the incremental effect for each group. The results 
reported in panel D of Table 5 show for both years 1 and 2 a positive incremental coefficient for 
the bias reversal from positive to negative, consistent with correction of undervaluation of these 
firms at t, and a negative coefficient for the bias reversal from negative to positive, consistent 
with a correction of overvaluation of those firms at t. However, although coefficient signs are 
consistent with mispricing corrections the incremental coefficients are not significant.20 The 
insignificance in this case can be due to the collinearity among the three score variables. We 
control for this by estimating regression (3) for each reversal group separately. Panels E and F 
report the results for the positive to negative bias reversal group and the negative to positive 
reversal group, respectively. The bias score coefficient in panel E is positive in both years 1 and 
2 (0.0065 and 0.0116, respectively), and larger in magnitude than in previous panels but not 
significant. In panel F the bias score coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level in 
year 1 (0.0139 t= 2.011), opposite to expectation, and negative in year 2. It is possible there is 
noise in the data and the statistical power is low due to the relatively small yearly samples (about 
                                                 
20 The reported mean coefficients are simple averages, i.e. equally weighted. We also calculated weighted mean 
coefficient estimates where the weights used were inversely proportional to the variance of each monthly coefficient 
estimate as in Chan et al (1991). In both cases we adjusted for serial correlation in the time series of coefficients as 
in Abarbanell and Bernard (2000). These adjustments did not lead to any more significant statistics or to changes in 
our inferences.  
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130 firms per year).21 Thus, the results of Table 5 provide only weak support for hypothesis 
H3.22  
 
5.3 Portfolio Analysis:  ROE Biases 
 Although in the above regression analysis the bias score coefficients are not statistically 
significant, their signs are suggestive of systematic corrections taking place when bias reversals 
occur. We obtain additional insights using the following bias reversal portfolio analysis. In each 
sample year we select firms for which the difference (RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} minus ROE) reverses 
and form three portfolios: (a) "positive to negative reversal” portfolio, (b) "negative to positive 
reversal” portfolio, and (c) "Non reversal" portfolio (the remaining firms in the sample). We 
trace these firms back five years before the reversal and one year after the reversal. For each of 
these seven years and for each portfolio we compute descriptive statistics and calculate annual 
raw and abnormal returns. These annual returns are for the year following the disclosure of the 
financial statements (the returns calculation starts from the seventh month after fiscal year-end). 
The abnormal returns are the residuals from regression (3) without the bias score variable. We 
estimate this regression each year for all firms and then calculate the mean residuals for the firms 
that belong to each portfolio. The advantage of calculating abnormal returns using such a 
regression is that it allows to control for various well-known risk factors (beta, size, book-to-
market) including R&D. Obviously, controlling for R&D is important in isolating a reporting 
bias effect. 
                                                 
21 We also examined sub-samples with large (above the median) reversals only, as well as sub-samples of large size 
firms with also large reversals (highly visible firms). In both cases bias score coefficients were large in magnitude 
and their signs were consistent with mispricing corrections but they were insignificant. Small sample sizes in these 
cases can be a reason for insignificant results. 
22 We also used returns starting with the 4th month (instead of the 7th month) after fiscal t year end to allow for an 
early reaction, i.e. reaction very soon after annual financial statements are disclosed. Nothing changed in our 
regression results by doing that.  
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 Table 6 reports the results from this portfolio analysis. Panel A presents the results for the 
“positive to negative reversal” portfolio. The bias driving variable reported in the first row of the 
panel shows a strong pattern: for the five years prior to the reversal the bias is consistently 
positive and almost monotonically increases, then it reverses by a substantial amount and 
remains negative at t+1. Thus, the bias builds up to a significant positive value before it reverses 
to a negative value and it takes, on average, six years to reverse. Recall that the expectation for 
this portfolio is to be undervalued given the presence of conservative accounting. Indeed, both 
raw and abnormal annual one-year ahead stock returns, reported in the second and third rows of 
the panel, peak in the year of the reversal. (Note that reported returns are for the year following 
the disclosure of the financial statements, i.e. returns reported for year t-1 are actually returns 
earned in year t). Thus, raw and abnormal returns in year t rise to 35.2% and 13.3%, respectively, 
and then decline, suggesting that a correction takes place. In particular, the abnormal returns 
pattern is consistent with an undervaluation of this portfolio: they are negative and large in 
magnitude in the three early years (-9.4%, -10.6%, -12.8%), close to zero in the year before the 
reversal (2.8%), positive and large in magnitude in the year of the reversal (13.3%), and drop to 
about zero in the last two years (2%, -0.7%).23  
The remaining data reported in the panel identify the characteristics of the firms in this 
portfolio. On average, about 140 firms have positive to negative reversals per year during our 
sample period. Their mean size (market capitalization) is close to $1 billion, systematic risk 
(beta) is well above the market’s average risk, and they are growth firms (E/P and B/M ratios 
below normal). These firms allocate about 6% of their sales revenues to R&D (R&D-to-sales) 
and their R&D growth rate is particularly strong in the five years before the reversal. This strong 
R&D growth rate leads to an accounting conservative bias (consistent with the above analysis) as 
                                                 
23 These results are consistent with the positive bias score coefficients reported in Table 5, panel E, for firms in this 
portfolio. 
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it is evident in the comparison of reported ROE and adjusted ROE: for the five years before the 
reversal reported ROE is less than adjusted ROE, while in the year of the reversal and the 
subsequent one the opposite holds. 
 Panel B reports the findings for the “negative to positive reversal” portfolio. The bias 
driving variable shows a declining pattern reaching a large negative value in year t-1 (-0.281) 
and reversing to a large positive value in year t (0.201). However, unlike the previous case, the 
bias in this portfolio reverses in a shorter period of time. The expectation for this portfolio is to 
be overvalued given the presence of aggressive accounting. Evidence of overvaluation is present 
in both the raw and abnormal annual stock returns. Thus, in year t-2 raw and abnormal returns 
reach mean values of 31.9% and 9.8%, respectively. A reversal is also evident in year t with 
mean raw returns declining to 10.5% and abnormal returns to -8%. This pattern is consistent with 
a market correction for this portfolio as well. The remaining data in this panel indicate that, on 
average, about 130 firms have such reversals per year over the sample period. These firms are 
smaller in size, more profitable, and with lower R&D growth than firms in panel A.  
 Panel C reports the results for the “Non reversal” portfolio. Most of the sample firms 
belong to this portfolio. The bias driving variable has consistently large positive values similar to 
those of the “positive to negative reversal” portfolio. However, unlike the other two portfolios, 
there is no specific pattern in stock returns. Raw and abnormal returns stay around 20% and 0% 
over the seven-year horizon, respectively. This increases our confidence that the patterns 
observed in the two portfolios described above reflect mispricing and its correction. It is also 
important to note that the yearly mean returns, especially the abnormal returns, are remarkably 
consistent with the all years mean returns for each portfolio reported in Table 6. Thus, the returns 
results are systematic and not driven by extreme values. 
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 We summarize this portfolio analysis by plotting the average annual abnormal returns 
(AR) for each of the portfolios over the seven-year horizon. Figure 1 shows the three lines: AR-
NR for the “Non reversal” portfolio, AR-PN for the “positive to negative reversal” portfolio, and 
AR-NP for the “negative to positive reversal” portfolio. Clearly, the AR-NR line is flat and close 
to zero. However, AR-NP and AR-PN show patterns consistent with overvaluation and 
undervaluation, respectively. AR-NP starts negative, increases to about 10%, then declines to 
-8% and converges to 0% by t+2, indicating a complete correction of the overvaluation. AR-PN 
starts negative, declines further to about -13%, then reverses to about 13% and also converges to 
0% by t+2, indicating a complete correction of the undervaluation. Overall, these portfolio 
results provide substantial support for our hypothesis H3.  
 
5.4 Regression Analysis:  Momentum Bias 
 
 Table 7 reports mean coefficient estimates of regression (3) for the R&D growth minus 
earnings momentum analysis and its structure is identical to Table 5. In panel A the results from 
the benchmark regression confirm once again that the only variable that is highly significant in 
all seven years is the R&D intensity (RDC/M). In panel B the R&D growth – earnings 
momentum bias score variable has a negative but insignificant coefficient in year 1 (-0.0020,     
t=  -1.642). This is a similar result to that reported in Table 5, panel B, in terms of sign but not of  
statistical significance. It indicates that firms with R&D growth greater than earnings growth (for 
which the score is 1) in year t earn negative but not significant abnormal returns one year ahead 
(t+1). The bias score coefficient continues to be negative insignificant in year 2 (not reported) 
but reverses sign to positive in year 3, and it is marginally significant at the 10% level (0.0023, 
t=1.674). 
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 The above results suggest that the earnings momentum bias effects (Table 7) appear to be 
weaker and persist over a shorter period of time than the ROE bias effects (Table 5). Panels C to 
F in Table 7 report evidence consistent with mispricing corrections for different firms at different 
times (as in Table 5). Thus, in panel C while the bias score coefficient is negative the change in 
the bias score coefficient is positive for both years reported. Panel D reports a positive 
incremental coefficient for the bias reversal from positive to negative (0.0013, t=0.179), 
consistent with correction of undervaluation of these firms at t, and a significantly at 10% level 
negative coefficient for the bias reversal from negative to positive (-0.0025, t= -1.794), 
consistent with correction of overvaluation of those firms at t. In panel E the bias score 
coefficient for the positive to negative bias reversal group is positive in both years 1 (0.0046,    
t= 0.42) and 2 (0.0076, t= 0.710) and larger in magnitude than in previous panels (but still not 
significant). In panel F the bias score coefficient for the negative to positive bias reversal group 
is negative in both years reported and significant at the 10% level in year 2 (-0.0103,                  
t= -1.903). The evidence is consistent with correction of overvaluation but with a delay.24 
Overall, although the coefficient patterns in Table 7 are similar to those in Table 5, the numbers 
in the two tables suggest a weaker effect of earnings momentum reporting bias than ROE 
reporting bias. This is consistent with the insignificant mean and median differences found in 
Table 4 between reported and R&D-capitalized earnings momentum. Thus, the results of Table 7 
provide only weak support for hypothesis H4.25 
 
 
                                                 
24 This slow reaction can be the result of short selling constraints and transaction costs that delay market correction 
(limited arbitrage). 
25 We also ran the regression separately for the following two groups: a) firms with positive to negative large 
reversals, and b) firms with negative to positive large reversals. Large reversals are defined as those with values 
above the median reversal value. The coefficients of the earnings momentum bias score variable are still 
insignificant, but consistent in sign, and larger in magnitude than those reported in panels E and F of Table 7.  
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5.5 Portfolio Analysis:  Momentum Bias 
Table 8 reports results for portfolios formed on the basis of the earnings momentum bias 
reversals. This analysis is similar to that reported in Table 6. Thus, in each sample year we select 
firms for which the difference RDG(5)it – EM(5)it reverses and we form three portfolios: (a) 
"positive to negative reversal” portfolio, (b) "negative to positive reversal” portfolio, and (c) 
"Non reversal" portfolio (the remaining firms in the sample). We trace these firms five years 
before and one year after the reversal year. Panel A reports the results for the “positive to 
negative reversal” portfolio. The bias driving variable (first raw), on average, reverses within a 
five year period (positive from t-4 to t-1 and reverses to negative at t). The expectation for this 
portfolio is to be undervalued given the presence of conservative accounting. While the raw 
returns do not show a strong pattern consistent with undervaluation and correction, the abnormal 
returns do. (Note that reported returns are for the year following the disclosure of the financial 
statements, i.e. returns reported for year t-1 are returns earned in year t). Thus, abnormal returns 
rise from 1.3% in t-3 to 8.2% and 7% in years t-1 and t, respectively, and then decline to 0%.  
Although the pattern and magnitude of abnormal returns in this case are not as 
pronounced as the pattern and magnitude in the corresponding ROE bias reversal portfolio 
(Table 6, panel A), they are still very similar. Both the R&D and earnings growth rates for this 
portfolio display high variability over the seven-year horizon (fourth and fifth rows). On average, 
about 130 firms have such positive to negative reversals per year over our sample period. These 
are not likely to be firms with a similar ROE bias reversal since they are larger in size (market 
capitalization close to $1.5 billion), they have lower systematic risk (beta), stronger growth 
(lower E/P and B/M ratios), and they are more R&D intensive (higher R&D-to-sales ratios) than 
the ROE reversal firms. A more direct comparison is described below.  
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 Panel B reports the results for the “negative to positive reversal” portfolio. Again, the 
bias driving variable (first raw), on average, reverses within a five year period. It shows a 
declining pattern reaching a large negative value in year t-1 (-5.817) and reversing to a large 
positive value in year t (4.527). The expectation for this portfolio is to be overvalued given the 
presence of aggressive accounting. Evidence of overvaluation and correction are present in both 
raw and abnormal annual stock returns. Thus, while prior to the reversal year raw returns are 
large and positive (30.4%, 24.6%, 26.7%), they decline in year t (11%). Abnormal returns are 
positive prior to the reversal year (9%, 4.8%, 5%), negative in the reversal year t (-3.6%), and 
then about 0%. This pattern is consistent with a market correction in this case as well. The 
remaining data in this panel indicate that, on average, about 118 firms have such reversals per 
year over our sample period. These firms have more stable R&D growth rates than the firms in 
panel A but have highly variable earnings growth rates. They are somewhat smaller in size but 
they have similar systematic risk, E/P, B/P and R&D intensity as the firms in panel A.  
 Panel C reports the results for the “Non reversal” portfolio of about 580 firms. Unlike the 
other two portfolios, there is no systematic pattern in the stock returns. Raw returns and 
abnormal returns stay around 16% and -1% over the seven-year horizon, respectively. Thus, the 
results in this panel are similar to those in Table 6, panel C. Overall, the results of Table 8 
indicate that the earnings momentum bias affects investor behavior. 
 As we did with the ROE bias portfolio analysis, we summarize the earnings momentum 
portfolio analysis by plotting the average annual abnormal returns (AR) for each of the three 
portfolios over the seven-year horizon. Figure 2 shows the three lines: AR-NR for the “Non 
reversal” portfolio, AR-PN for the “positive to negative reversal” portfolio, and AR-NP for the 
“negative to positive reversal” portfolio. All the lines show a pattern consistent with our 
expectations. Thus, the AR-NR line is rather flat and close to zero. The AR-NP line shows a 
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clear overvaluation and a subsequent correction pattern: starting positive, declining to negative 
values and converging to zero. The AR-PN line shows the opposite pattern: an initial 
undervaluation, then abnormal returns building up to positive values and converging to zero, 
consistent with a correction. Overall, these portfolio results indicate that the earnings momentum 
bias variable has valuation implications and thus provide support for our hypothesis H4.  
 
5.6 Firms with simultaneous ROE and earnings momentum bias reversals 
 The above analysis is based on either the ROE or the earnings momentum reversal 
analysis. However, it is possible that for some sample firms reversals in both ROE and earnings 
momentum biases occur in the same year. This can be an interesting sub-sample to examine 
because firms with such reversals potentially become more visible to investors and thus we 
expect to detect more pronounced returns patterns than those presented above.  
Table 9 reports the results from the simultaneous ROE and earnings momentum bias 
reversal analysis for two portfolios: "positive to negative reversal” portfolio in panel A, and 
"negative to positive reversal” portfolio in panel B. On average, about 30 firms have such 
simultaneous reversals per year over our sample period. This is about 22% of firms with either 
type of reversal reported in panels A and B of Tables 6 and 8. In addition, these firms have 
higher E/P ratios relative to the sample firms and are of average size. In both panels A and B of 
Table 9 the patterns of both raw and abnormal returns are consistent with initial misvaluation and 
subsequent correction. Thus, in panel A the returns keep increasing up to year t and then decline, 
suggesting that a correction takes place. In particular, the abnormal returns pattern is consistent 
with the undervaluation of this portfolio: the returns are large negative in the three early years    
(-7.6%, -9.3%, -4.9%), large positive in the following two years including the year of the 
reversal (10.2%, 13%), and stay low after the reversal year (0.7%, -2.8%). The opposite pattern 
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appears in panel B, consistent with an initial overvaluation and subsequent correction: large 
positive abnormal returns in the three early years (10.9%, 3.3%, 12.5%), and negative in the 
following three years (-1%, -7.1%, -2.6%).  
In Figure 3 we plot the average annual abnormal returns (AR) for each of the two 
portfolios over the seven-year horizon. The line for the "positive to negative reversal” portfolio, 
AR-PN, starts and stays negative for three consecutive years indicating strong undervaluation, 
then it become positive (reverses) and converges to 0% consistent with complete correction. The 
line for the "negative to positive reversal” portfolio, AR-NP, displays the opposite pattern: starts 
and stays positive for three consecutive years, indicating strong overvaluation, then becomes 
negative (reverses) and converges to about 0% by t+1. The opposite movement in the two lines is 
clear and consistent with undervaluation in one case and overvaluation in the other.26 The 
evidence from these two specific portfolios provides strong support for our hypotheses H3 and 
H4.  
 
5.7 Sensitivity analysis 
We carried out additional analyses to examine the sensitivity of the results reported 
above. First, we used a three-year earnings growth rate calculation rather than five, with 
essentially identical results. In addition, since growth rates the way we calculate them above can 
be noisy (excessive weight is placed on the first and last observations), we also used the method 
employed by Dechow and Sloan (1997) that smoothes the calculation.27 Only marginal 
                                                 
26 We also estimated future returns regressions, as in Tables 5 and 7, for each of these two portfolios. None of the 
estimated coefficients was significant, most likely due to the low yearly sample size in these two portfolios. 
However, the coefficients of the bias score variable were large (above 1%) and consistent with 
undervaluation/overvaluation corrections: positive for the “positive to negative reversal” portfolio and negative for 
the “negative to positive reversal” portfolio.  
27 Under this method we fit a least squares growth line to the logarithms of the five annual earnings or R&D 
observations.  
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improvements appeared in some regression results. Second, we examined whether large mergers 
and acquisitions have an impact on our results by identifying sample firms with at least 50% 
change in annual sales. We detected 1,558 such large mergers over our sample period. Of those, 
177 are for firms that belong to our “positive to negative reversal” portfolio, i.e. about 9 firms 
per year on average, and 142 are for firms that belong to our “negative to positive reversal” 
portfolio, i.e. about 7 firms per year on average. We did not detect any large mergers in our 
“simultaneous ROE and earnings momentum reversal” portfolio. We rerun both the regression 
and portfolio analyses excluding the firms with large mergers, and observed minor changes in 
the results, but our inferences did not change. Third, we controlled for price momentum, 
documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) among others, by including in our regressions (3) 
the returns for the six months before portfolio formation. Neither the regression nor the portfolio 
results were affected by this change, and thus our inferences are not altered.28  
 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
 
 We ask in this study:  When is the immediate expensing of R&D (current GAAP) 
conservative and when is it aggressive, relative to reporting under R&D capitalization, and what 
are the capital market implications of these reporting biases?  To address these questions we 
construct a model of profitability reporting biases and identify that the key drivers of the 
reporting biases are:  the differences between R&D growth rate and earnings (change) 
                                                 
28 We also run the regression analyses using R&D expenditures-to-market (RD/M) as a measure of R&D intensity 
instead of R&D capital-to-market (RDC/M) and compared the two sets of results. This allows us to examine 
whether future stock returns are correlated more with R&D expenditures (flows) than with underlying R&D assets 
(stocks).  The RD/M coefficients are consistently positive and significant, consistent with the results of Chan et al 
(2001). Comparing the RD/M and RDC/M coefficients reveals that the RDC/M coefficients are always larger and 
with higher t-statistics than the RD/M coefficients. In addition, both the ROE and earnings momentum bias score 
coefficients obtain higher values and significance when RD/M is in the regressions. These results suggest that the 
market places higher weights on capitalized R&D values than in expensed R&D values. In other words, stock prices 
reflect R&D expenditures as if they has been capitalized and amortized, i.e. as if investors price an intangible asset. 
This is consistent with evidence provided by Lev et al (2002) and Healy et al (2002). 
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momentum, and between R&D growth and ROE.  In general, companies with a high growth rate 
of R&D relative to their profitability (typically early life cycle companies) report conservatively, 
while firms with a low R&D growth rate relative to profitability (mature companies) tend to 
report aggressively. 
In our initial empirical analyses we validate the predictions of the model on a large 
sample of firms. Thus, profitability reporting biases are present in the data and they appear to be 
more significant for ROE, relative to R&D growth, than for the earnings momentum. We then 
analyze the stock returns of the sample firms to examine whether investor valuations are affected 
by the profitability reporting biases. We find evidence consistent with investor fixation on the 
reported profitability measures. Thus, the stocks of conservatively reporting firms appear to be 
undervalued while the stocks of aggressively reporting firms are overvalued, and these 
misvaluations appear to be corrected when the reporting bias reverses from conservative to 
aggressive, or vice versa. In addition, the misvaluations appear to be more significant for ROE 
than for the earnings momentum indicator.  
The social relevance of systematic mispricing of securities is that it leads to misallocation 
of resources at both the real and capital markets.  Systematic undervaluations of stocks, for 
example, implies that the underpriced firms are burdened with excessive cost of capital, leading 
to suboptimal investment and stunted growth.  In the capital markets, mispricing of securities 
cause wealth transfers between current and new shareholders.  Alleviating mispricing is 
obviously beneficial to firms, shareholders, and society at large.  In closing, we should note, 
however, that there is no assurance that a GAAP requirement for the capitalization of R&D will 
eliminate all the current mispricings, although the preliminary evidence (e.g., Aboody and Lev, 
1998) is encouraging. 
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Appendix A 
 
If the growth rate of R&D expense is zero, then after a full amortization cycle is complete, both 
capitalizing and expensing firms will have the same earnings but the capitalizing firm will have 
more assets and thus lower ROA (or ROE). To see this, set g = 0 and notice that as in the 
example, both firms have the same income in years t ≥ T but the assets/equity of the capitalizing 
firm is higher in all periods after T: 
  
Thus, the capitalizing firm has a lower return on assets in any year t < T. The argument for return 
on equity is similar after adjusting for the tax rate. 
The extension of this result to the case where the growth rate is non-zero involves the 
observation that as long as the depreciation pattern used by the firm is stable, the unrecorded 
R&D asset also grows at the rate g.29   That is, denoting the (unrecorded) R&D asset at time n by  
RD_CAPn, the asset in year n + 1 will be (1+g) RD_CAPn. The consequences for ROE may 
now be derived. First, by definition, nnn
c CAPRDBVA = BVA _+ . Second, we have the following 
relationship between earnings in year n measured under the two different accounting methods: 
{ }
 
CAPgRD )  - 1 ( + E =CAPRDCAPRD   )  - 1 ( + E = E nnnnnn
c
11 ___ −−− ττ  
Combining these results, we obtain a result linking the growth rate of expenditures and the 
decision to capitalize or expense these expenditures with the reported return on assets and equity. 
                                                 
29 By a stable pattern of depreciation, we mean that for an asset of value A bought in year t, the depreciation in year 
t+n, denoted by ∗t,nA,  is independent of the date of purchase , t.  We are thankful to an anonymous referee for 
bringing this approach to our attention. Under an assumption of straight-line depreciation, a closed-form expression 
can be derived for this unrecorded asset as we showed in an earlier version of this paper.   
C  
2
1)-T(T    +  BVA =   T
iC  +  BVA = BVA n1-T 1 = inn
c 
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Before deriving this result we state a simple but useful fact as a separate lemma mainly for ease 
of reference. 
Lemma 1 
Suppose y + z > 0 and z > 0. Then for any x, y, .
z
w 
y
x      
y
x  
z)+(y
w)+(x ≥⇔≥   
Proof 
Cross-multiplying and using the fact that   y + z and z are positive, we obtain: 
.
y
x  
z
w  
y
xz     w
y
xz + x   w+ x  
y
x 
z)+(y
w)+(x ≥⇔≥⇔≥⇔≥  
Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition 1 
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Substituting for En c and BVAtc from the identities derived earlier, Lemma 1 shows that: 
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Note that in the expressions above, y, z, and y + z, are all positive as required in Lemma 1. This 
establishes the result of the proposition for ROA. The analogous criterion for ROE is 
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g/2)+g/(1   ROEn ≥ . To see this, note that the difference in the book value of equity is (1-τ)z 
(where z is as defined in the proposition). Thus the analogous ratio is w/(1-τ) z yielding the  
required result. Q.E.D 
Proposition 1 compares return on assets and returns on equity across policies of expensing and 
capitalizing expenditures. The intuition underlying the finding is a straightforward: under 
positive expenditure growth, the earnings under expensing, En, is always less than that under    
capitalization, Enc ; however, the total assets (or equity)  also increases under capitalization and 
the question then becomes of  whether the numerator increase outweighs the denominator 
increase. The criterion stated in the proposition provides a simple relationship between the 
growth rate of earnings and the growth rate of expenditures that characterizes when a policy of 
expensing R&D might lead to higher reported ratios. At a growth rate of zero, there is no effect 
on the numerator and it is always better to expense. As the growth rate becomes increasingly 
positive, the gain in reported income outweighs the increase in assets/equity resulting in a higher 
ROA/ROE under capitalization. This intuition is straight-forward; the interest in the proposition 
stems from the simplicity of the cutoff point where capitalization increases ROA, and in 
particular, that this cutoff does not depend on the length of the amortization cycle. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Let  En represent the earnings of the firm that expenses R&D and  
E
E  -  E = EM
1 - n
1 - nn
n   represent 
the earnings growth of  this  firm. Then the earnings of the capitalizing firm, En
c  is given by: 
1_: −n
1-n1 - n
c
nn
c
CAPRD = XWhere
X + E =  Eg)X+(1  +  E  = E
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Therefore, the earnings growth of the firm that capitalizes R&D, denoted EMnc , is given  
by: 
X  +  E
Xg + )E  -  E( = 
X  +  E
X]  -  g) + [X(1 + )E  -  E( = 
E
E  -  E = EM
1-n
1-nn
1-n
1-nn
n
c
1-n
c
n
c
n
c  
Using the lemma stated earlier with X  =z   ,E  =  w Xg,  =y   ),E - E(  =  x 1-n1-nn , we 
obtain: g   EM  EM    EM nn
c
n ≥⇔≥   (notice that we need  Enc  > 0 to apply the lemma). 
 Q.E.D 
As we showed explicitly in the example, if the growth rate in R&D expenditures is 
positive, earnings are always higher under capitalization. The same intuition shows that 
for any positive growth rate in R&D expenditures, the earnings change, En  -  En-1 is 
greater under capitalization. The result in Proposition 3 shows that under high earnings 
growth and low expense growth, the reduction in the denominator, En-1, under expensing 
is proportionately greater than the reduction on the earnings change En  -  En-1 found in 
the  numerator. For firms with these growth characteristics, earnings growth is overstated 
under a policy of expensing R&D expenditures.  
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Table 1 
Sample Summary Statistics 
 
For selected fiscal years from 1975 to 1995, the data indicate total R&D expenditure (the GAAP expense) as well as R&D 
amortization and R&D capital, calculated for all U.S. firms engaged in R&D and listed on NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq with valid data 
on the Compustat files.  The R&D data are expressed as a percentage of: sales, earnings, and book value of equity.  Percentages are 
computed by adding numerator and denominator data across all companies (i.e., weighted averages). 
 
 
 
 R&D expenditures (and accounting 
expense) as percent of : 
R&D amortization as percent of: R&D capital as 
percent of 
Number 
of 
Year Sales Earnings Book value Sales Earnings Book value book value firms 
1975 1.70 36.1       4.13 0.86 18.14 2.08 10.55 1,280 
1980 1.78 34.4       5.08 1.15 22.13 3.27 12.55 1,282 
1985 3.01 83.7       8.11 2.14 59.71 5.79 21.25 1,668 
1990 3.40 79.4       9.59 2.61 60.86 7.35 25.76 1,665 
1995 3.75 65.3      10.88 2.90 50.42 8.41 28.73 1,796 
2000 4.54 96.9        9.22 3.36 71.86 6.83 24.90 3,569 
 
Notes:  
R&D expenditures (RD) is Compustat item # 46. 
Sales is Compustat item # 12. 
Earnings is Compustat item # 172. 
Book value is Compustat item # 60. 
R&D amortization for firm i at time t is equal to 0.2 * (RDit-1 + RDit-2 + RDit-3 + RDit-4 + RDit-5).  
R&D capital for firm i at time t is equal to .RD2.0RD4.0RD6.0RD8.0RD 4321 −−−− ×+×+×+×+ ititititit  
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Table 2 
Median Growth Rates of R&D and Earnings and the Values of ROE for Selected Industries 
(Growth Rates are Measured over Five Years and Presented as Percentages) 
 
 
  Five-year R&D Growth Five-year Earnings Growth Return on Equity 
SIC Industry 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 
737 Computer programming, 
software & services 
124.8 31.4 100.8 100.8 74.5 32.7 75.5 98.0 11.3 2.8    7.9 -27.0 
283 Drugs & 
pharmaceuticals 
85.8 111.3 85.4 81.0 33.4 57.4 25.6 18.0 12.1 2.4    1.6 -26.0 
357 Computers & office 
equipment 
82.7 55.7 33.3 68.0 29.8 21.3 53.3 8.8 8.8 6.4    9.5 -1.9 
38 Measuring 
 instruments 
71.0 36.2 31.5 56.7 16.4 45.7 54.4 40.4 9.3 8.4    8.8 3.6 
36 Electrical equipment 
excluding computers 
81.6 33.7 44.4 89.0 -19.9 14.4 119.4 99.5 9.0 4.7  12.5 4.1 
48 Communications 123.9 -7.2 6.5 19.0 -91.6 105.2 -47.0 97.7 1.0 18.1    4.5 -9.7 
37 Transportation 
equipment 
49.9 24.0 46.6 51.9 89.8 2.2 166.8 43.4 13.3 9.5  17.1 14.4 
 
Notes:  
R&D growth equals (RDt - RDt-4)/RDt-4, where RD is R&D expenditures - Compustat item # 46. 
Earnings Growth equals (earningst - earningst-4)/|earningst-4|, where earnings is Compustat item # 172.  
Return on equity equals earningst/Average book value of equity at t-1 and t. Book value of equity is Compustat item # 60. 
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Table 3 
ROE Biases:  Reported versus R&D capitalized ROE values 
Mean and Median values of various variables for portfolios ranked by annualized R&D growth {RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} minus one year ROE 
and R&D to sales (RDS).  Median values are in square brackets.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  The sample consists of 32,336 
firm-year observations evenly allocated to the nine portfolios.   
Annualized R&D growth 
minus one year ROE 
High Medium Low 
R&D to Sales (RDS) High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Annualized R&D Growth 
{RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]} 
0.450 
 [0.368] 
0.460 
[0.419] 
0.408 
[0.390] 
0.165 
[0.167] 
0.149 
[0.151] 
0.139 
[0.142] 
0.042 
[0.029] 
0.007 
[0.015] 
-0.038 
[-0.026] 
Annualized R&D Growth 
minus one year ROE 
 1.716 
 [0.848] 
0.860 
[0.464] 
1.071 
[0.435] 
0.078 
[0.075] 
0.060 
[0.050] 
0.054 
[0.043] 
-1.302 
[-0.135] 
-0.363 
[-0.130] 
-0.334 
[-0.166] 
R&D to Sales (RDS)  6.477 
 [0.265] 
0.077 
[0.074] 
0.018 
[0.016] 
0.134 
[0.081] 
0.029 
[0.028] 
0.008 
[0.008] 
0.454 
[0.060] 
0.018 
[0.017] 
0.005 
[0.005] 
Reported ROE (ROE)  -1.266 
[-0.408] 
-0.400 
[0.021] 
-0.663 
[0.021] 
0.088 
[0.099] 
0.089 
[0.105] 
0.085 
[0.105] 
1.343 
[0.182] 
0.370 
[0.154] 
0.296 
[0.146] 
R&D-Capitalized ROE 
(ROEC) 
 -0.223 
[-0.135] 
-0.058 
[0.076] 
-0.199 
[0.048] 
0.102 
[0.116] 
0.096 
[0.110] 
0.087 
[0.107] 
0.455 
[0.127] 
0.129 
[0.137] 
0.224 
[0.138] 
Reported ROE minus R&D-
Capitalized ROE          
(ROE-ROEC) 
 -1.032 
(-8.805) 
[-0.240] 
(-2.05) 
-0.339 
(-6.808) 
[-0.061] 
(-1.225) 
-0.462 
(-4.154) 
[-0.022] 
(-0.198) 
-0.022 
(-9.013) 
[-0.015] 
(-6.244) 
-0.008 
(-18.999) 
[-0.005] 
(-12.488) 
-0.003 
(-8.762) 
[-0.001] 
(-3.155) 
0.881 
(2.271) 
[0.029] 
(0.075) 
0.241 
(3.680) 
[0.013] 
(0.199) 
0.071 
(1.322) 
[0.005] 
(0.094) 
Book-to-Market   0.383 
[0.262] 
0.477 
[0.456] 
0.421 
[0.675] 
0.667 
[0.557] 
0.893 
[0.765] 
0.924 
[0.932] 
0.219 
[0.415] 
-0.111 
[0.666] 
0.615 
[0.795] 
Earnings-to-Price  -0.247 
[-0.095] 
-0.229 
[0.011] 
-0.204 
[0.022] 
0.029 
[0.043] 
0.043 
[0.068] 
0.054 
[0.084] 
-0.140 
[0.059] 
-0.264 
[0.085] 
0.002 
[0.100] 
Market capitalization  
($ million) 
179 
[35] 
252 
[33] 
228 
[25] 
928 
[57] 
609 
[82] 
792 
[76]
1,673 
[49] 
887 
[71] 
1,181 
[60] 
 
Notes: 
Annualized R&D growth (RDG) equals [(RDt - RDt-4)/RDt-4]/4, where RD is R&D expenditures - Compustat item #46. Reported ROE equals Earningst/Average book value of 
equity at t-1 and t. Earnings is Compustat item # 172. Book value of equity is Compustat item # 60. R&D-Capitalized ROE equals Adjusted earningst/Adjusted average book value 
of equity at t-1 and t. Adjusted earningst equals reported earningst plus R&D expenditurest minus R&D amortizationt. R&D amortizationt equals 0.2 * (RDit-1 + RDit-2 + RDit-3 + 
RDit-4 + RDit-5). Adjusted book value equals reported book value plus R&D capital. R&D capital equals .RD2.0RD4.0RD6.0RD8.0RD 4321 −−−− ×+×+×+×+ ititititit  
Book-to-market, earnings-to-price, and market capitalization are computed as of the fiscal year-end. R&D-to-sales equals Compustat item #46 divided by item # 12. 
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Table 4 
Earnings change (momentum) biases:  Reported versus R&D-Capitalized momentum values  
Mean and median values of various variables for portfolios ranked by R&D growth minus earnings momentum and R&D-to-sales. Median 
values are in square brackets.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  The sample consists of 17,865 firm-year observations evenly 
allocated to the nine portfolios. 
R&D growth minus earnings 
momentum 
High Medium Low 
R&D-to-Sales (RDS) High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low 
R&D Growth [RDG(5)] 2.771 
 [1.216] 
2.050 
[0.995] 
1.549 
[0.728] 
0.691 
[0.536] 
0.519 
[0.438] 
0.361 
[0.321] 
0.710 
[0.358] 
0.504 
[0.251] 
0.116 
[0.042] 
R&D growth minus earnings 
momentum 
 10.563 
 [3.148] 
6.116 
[2.182] 
5.362 
[1.940] 
0.294 
[0.288] 
0.282 
[0.281] 
0.254 
[0.227] 
-6.346 
[-1.520] 
-6.833 
[-1.526] 
-6.739 
[-1.458] 
R&D-to-sales (RDS)  2.877 
 [0.135] 
0.047 
[0.045] 
0.011 
[0.011] 
0.302 
[0.075] 
0.027 
[0.026] 
0.008 
[0.008] 
0.259 
[0.080] 
0.027 
[0.025] 
0.007 
[0.007] 
Reported earnings 
momentum [EM(5)] 
 -7.792 
[-1.580] 
-4.066 
[-0.942] 
-3.813 
[-0.978] 
0.397 
[0.266] 
0.237 
[0.198] 
0.107 
[0.094] 
7.055 
[1.910] 
7.337 
[1.827] 
6.856 
[1.486] 
R&D-capitalized earnings 
momentum [EM(5)C] 
 -6.434 
[-0.986] 
-3.029 
[-0.719] 
-3.529 
[-0.898] 
0.832 
[0.249] 
0.281 
[0.187] 
0.057 
[0.089] 
6.369 
[1.439] 
6.872 
[1.560] 
5.962 
[1.353] 
Reported earnings 
momentum minus R&D- 
capitalized earnings 
momentum[EM(5)- EM(5)C] 
 -1.357 
(-0.751) 
[-0.654] 
(-0.362) 
-1.037 
(-0.909) 
[-0.299] 
(-0.262) 
-0.284 
(-0.612) 
[-0.079] 
(-0.170) 
-0.435 
(-1.868) 
[0.034] 
(0.146) 
-0.044 
(-0.877) 
[0.015] 
(0.301) 
0.050 
(3.253) 
[0.009] 
(0.585) 
0.686 
(0.519) 
[0.373] 
(0.283) 
0.465 
(0.287) 
[0.204] 
(0.126) 
0.894 
(1.002) 
[0.080] 
(0.246) 
Book-to-market  0.553 
 [0.492] 
-0.051 
[0.684] 
0.136 
[0.874] 
0.537 
[0.476] 
0.399 
[0.660] 
0.534 
[0.769] 
0.409 
[0.414] 
0.503 
[0.550] 
0.503 
[0.693] 
Earnings-to-price  -0.269 
[-0.054] 
-0.424 
[0.001] 
-0.607 
[-0.002] 
-0.015 
[0.054] 
0.050 
[0.072] 
0.028 
[0.079] 
-0.018 
[0.050] 
0.055 
[0.076] 
0.060 
[0.094] 
Market capitalization  
($ million) 
327 
[45] 
601 
[45] 
488 
[46] 
2,456 
[127] 
1,315 
[244] 
1,747 
[207] 
1,092 
[59] 
1,117 
[81] 
1,084 
[84] 
 
Notes: 
R&D growth equals [(RDt - RDt-4)/RDt-4], where RD is R&D expenditures - Compustat item #46. Reported earnings momentum equals (earningst - earningst-4)/|earningst-4|, where 
earningst is Compustat item # 172. R&D-capitalized earnings momentum equals (adjusted earningst – adjusted earningst-4)/|adjusted earningst-4|. Adjusted earningst equals reported 
earningst plus R&D expenditurest minus R&D amortizationt. R&D amortizationt equals 0.2 * (RDit-1 + RDit-2 + RDit-3 + RDit-4 + RDit-5). Book-to-market, earnings-to-price, and 
market capitalization are computed as of the fiscal year-end. R&D-to-sales equals Compustat item #46 divided by item # 12. 
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Table 5 
The Consequences of ROE Biases 
Mean coefficient estimates of cross-sectional regressions of monthly stock returns on lagged values of fundamental variables. The returns are for the 
seven years following a given fiscal year over the period 1975-1995. The returns for year 1 are the 12 monthly returns of firm i from the 7th month 
after fiscal year-end, for year 2 are the 12 monthly returns of firm i from the 19th month after fiscal year-end, and so on for year 7. The mean 
coefficients for each year ahead are computed over 252 monthly regressions in the period 1975-1995 (21 years times 12 months per year). T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses.  
 
Panel A:  Benchmark Regression 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t +e i,t+j      
Years ahead 
Regressions 
Intercept Beta 
β 
Size 
M 
B/M A/B E(+)/M E/M 
Dummy 
RDC/M ROE bias 
score 
Change in 
ROE bias 
sccore 
Adj. R2 
Year 1 0.0303 0.0000 -0.0014 0.0024 0.0001 0.0027 -0.0043 0.0027 - - 0.019 
 (13.320) (0.030) (-3.738) (3.190) (0.120) (0.327) (-3.172) (6.822)    
Year 3 0.0211 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0016 -0.0003 0.0083 -0.0014 0.0015 - - 0.01 
 (8.508) (0.443) (-1.299) (1.737) (-0.310) (0.918) (-0.935) (3.480)    
Year 5 0.0206 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0024 0.0065 0.0008 0.0021 - - 0.005 
 (7.021) (0.767) (-0.347) (0.083) (-1.898) (0.494) (0.434) (3.291)    
Year 7 0.018 0.0007 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0032 0.0027 -0.0008 0.0016 - - 0.004 
 (5.667) (0.741) (0.444) (0.738) (-2.468) (0.233) (-0.409) (2.653)    
Panel B:  Benchmark regression and the ROE bias score variable 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (ROE bias score) i,t +e i,t+j      
Year 1 0.0319 0.0003 -0.0014 0.0022 -0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0037 0.0028 -0.0031 - 0.02 
 (13.799) (0.292) (-3.824) (2.936) (-0.012) (-0.100) (-2.734) (7.129) (-2.602)   
Year 3 0.0212 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0015 -0.0004 0.0069 -0.0013 0.0015 -0.0003 - 0.01 
 (8.145) (0.471) (-1.320) (1.664) (-0.388) (0.753) (-0.845) (3.438) (-0.211)   
Year 5 0.0197 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0023 0.0083 0.0003 0.0021 0.0016 - 0.005 
 (6.646) (0.736) (-0.278) (0.145) (-1.829) (0.611) (0.174) (3.237) (0.953)   
Year 7 0.0172 0.0005 0.0002 0.001 -0.0032 0.0066 -0.0010 0.0015 0.0017 - 0.004 
 (5.294) (0.532) (0.475) (0.909) (-2.456) (0.583) (-0.503) (2.532) (0.934)   
Panel C:  Benchmark regressions, the ROE bias score, and the change in the score 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (ROE bias score) i,t +   
                   c 9,j ( change in ROE bias score) i,t  + e i,t+j      
Year 1 0.0317 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0023 -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0036 0.0028 -0.0027 0.0009 0.02 
 (13.648) (0.286) (-3.817) (2.999) (-0.022) (-0.050) (-2.627) (6.957) (-2.111) (0.570)  
Year 2 0.0278 -0.0011 -0.0010 0.0015 0.0009 -0.0071 -0.0016 0.0018 -0.0009 0.0002 0.015 
 (10.510) (-1.241) (-2.769) (1.905) (0.950) (-0.746) (-1.038) (4.360) (-0.612) (0.157)  
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Table 5: continued  
Panel D:  Benchmark regression and the ROE bias score controlling also for {RDGit/[(RDGit/2)+1]} -ROEit reversals 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (ROE bias score) i,t +   
                   c 9,j (ROE bias score*Dpn) i,t  + c 10,j (ROE bias score*Dnp) i,t  e i,t+j      
Regressions Intercept Beta 
β 
Size 
M 
BM AB E(+)/M E/M 
Dummy 
RCM ROE 
bias  
score 
ROE bias  
Score*Dpn 
ROE bias  
Score*Dnp 
Adj. R2 
Year 1 0.0319 0.0003 -0.0014 0.0023 -0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0037 0.0028 -0.0028 0.0018 -0.0005 0.02 
 (13.584) (0.305) (-3.816) (3.008) (-0.040) (-0.105) (-2.709) (7.086) (-2.361) (0.478) (-0.273)  
Year 2 0.0278 -0.0011 -0.0010 0.0015 0.0010 -0.008 -0.0017 0.0017 -0.0007 0.0026 -0.0005 0.015 
 (10.536) (-1.205) (-2.783) (1.931) (0.999) (-0.832) (-1.082) (4.310) (-0.537) (0.625) (-0.283)  
Panel E: Benchmark regression and the ROE bias score for positive  to negative reversals only 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (ROE bias score) i,t +e i,t+j      
Year 1 0.0342 -0.001 -0.0022 0.0013 0.0002 0.007 -0.0037 0.0028 0.0065 - - 0.008 
 (6.200) (-0.510) (-3.264) (0.668) (0.066) (0.339) (-0.524) (3.004) (0.691)    
Year 2 0.029 -0.0018 -0.0015 0.0009 0.0034 -0.0092 -0.0018 0.0031 0.0116 - - 0.006 
 (5.049) (-0.818) (-2.488) (0.404) (1.499) (-0.425) (-0.323) (3.095) (1.485)    
Panel F: Benchmark regression and the ROE bias score for negative to positive reversals only 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (ROE bias score) i,t +e i,t+j      
Year 1 0.019 -0.0008 -0.0009 0.001 -0.0034 0.0433 0.002 0.0027 0.0139 - - 0.005 
 (3.317) (-0.371) (-1.462) (0.546) (-1.162) (1.831) (0.731) (3.065) (2.011)    
Year 2 0.0258 -0.0032 -0.0007 0.0025 0.0027 -0.0028 0.001 0.0014 -0.0013 - - 0.001 
 (3.619) (-1.198) (-1.169) (1.345) (0.987) (-0.104) (0.197) (1.280) (-0.169)    
 
Notes: 
Ri,t+j= monthly stock returns of firm i, stating with the 7th month after fiscal t year-end, j = 1,…..,84, βi,t= CAPM-based beta of firm i, estimated from 60 monthly stock returns up 
to month t (one month preceding the return calculation); a minimum of 24 months is required, Mi,t= market value of firm i, calculated as price times number of shares outstanding  
at t, the beginning of the returns calculation period, (B/M)i,t= book-to-market ratio of firm i at fiscal year-end, (A/B)i,t= ratio of book value of total assets to book value of common  
equity of firm i at fiscal year-end, [E(+)/M]i,t= ratio of positive earnings to the market value of equity of firm i at fiscal year-end and equal to 0 when earnings are negative, (E/M  
dummy)i,t = 1 if earnings are negative and 0 otherwise, (RDC/M)i,t= estimated R&D capital-to-market value of equity at fiscal year-end, (ROE bias score)i,t = scaled decile  
rank of ({RDGit/[(RDGit/2)+1]} -ROEit) constructed by ranking the values of this difference into deciles (0,9) each year t and dividing the decile number by nine so that each firm i  
takes on a decile rank value ranging between zero and one in each year t. The ranking is on an ascending order and thus firms with the most negative  {RDGit/[(RDGit/2)+1]} – 
ROEit values are assigned the score of zero while the firms with the most positive {RDGit/[(RDGit/2)+1]} -ROEit values are assigned the score of 1. Dpn =1 when  
{RDGit/[(RDGit/2)+1]} -ROEit is positive at t-1 but reverses to negative at t, Dnp =1 when {RDGit/[(RDGit/2)+1]} -ROEit is negative at t-1 but reverses to positive at t.  
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Table 6 
ROE Bias Reversal Analysis 
In each year from 1975 to 1995 we detect firms for which the difference RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE reverses. For example, for year 1980 we detect 
firms that had RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE >0 in 1979 but <0 in 1980. This is our "positive to negative reversal" portfolio. We also detect firms that 
had RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE <0 in 1979 but >0 in 1980. This is our "negative to positive reversal" portfolio. The remaining firms comprise the 
"Non reversal" portfolio. We trace these firms five years before and one year after the reversal year. For each of these seven years and for each 
portfolio we report mean values of key characteristics including annual raw and abnormal returns. These returns are for the year following the 
disclosure of the financial statements, i.e. we start the annual return calculation from the seventh month after fiscal year end. The abnormal returns 
are the residuals from the regression:  
R i,t+j = c 0,j + c 1,j β i,t + c 2,jln(M) i,t +c 3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c 4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c 5,j (E(+)/M) i,t + c 6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c 7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t +e i,t+j.  
We run this regression each year for all firms and we report the mean residuals for the firms that belong to each portfolio.  
 
Panel A: "positive to negative reversal" portfolio 
       Years relative to the reversal year t 
    t-5  t-4  t-3  t-2  t-1  t  t+1 
 
R&D growth - ROE  0.117  0.191  0.210  0.186  0.277  -0.118 -0.024 
                  
Raw returns   0.100  0.099  0.094  0.240  0.352   0.214  0.200 
 
Abnormal returns      -0.094      -0.106      -0.128  0.028  0.133   0.020 -0.007 
 
R&D growth Rate  0.221  0.261   0.242  0.204   0.155    0.018   0.049 
 
Reported ROE  0.103  0.070  0.032    0.018      -0.122   0.136   0.073 
 
R&D-Capitalized ROE 0.119  0.111  0.073  0.050      -0.015   0.098  0.067 
 
R&D to sales  0.048  0.065  0.076  0.062  0.059   0.047  0.053 
 
Earnings-to-price  0.091  0.084  0.072  0.062  0.044   0.077  0.064 
 
Book-to-market  0.896  0.896  0.921  0.936  0.868   0.807  0.774 
 
Beta    1.291  1.252  1.240  1.218  1.189   1.163  1.144 
 
Market Capitalization  843    824   794   794   850    958    1126 
 
No. of firms   101   111   122   130   139    140     128 
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Table 6: continued 
Panel B: "negative to positive reversal" portfolio 
 
       Years relative to the reversal year t 
    t-5  t-4  t-3  t-2  t-1  t  t+1 
 
R&D growth – ROE  0.152  0.095  0.074  0.015  -0.281 0.201  0.170 
 
Raw returns   0.203  0.252  0.319  0.192   0.105 0.144  0.195     
 
Abnormal returns      -0.008  0.023  0.098      -0.010  -0.080     -0.025  0.000 
 
R&D growth Rate  0.211  0.134  0.111  0.076   0.044 0.186  0.196 
 
Reported ROE  0.059  0.039  0.036  0.061   0.325     -0.015  0.026 
 
R&D-Capitalized ROE 0.091  0.068  0.067  0.081   0.121 0.027  0.052 
 
R&D to sales  0.058  0.062  0.055  0.043   0.045 0.057  0.065 
 
Earnings-to-price  0.082  0.078  0.077  0.078   0.083 0.048  0.055 
 
Book-to-market  0.958  0.938  0.895  0.833   0.779 0.806  0.803 
 
Beta    1.254  1.233  1.222  1.204   1.209 1.180  1.156 
 
Market Capitalization   671   673   734   751    697   760   890 
 
No. of firms    91   101    107   116    132   132   120 
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Table 6: continued 
Panel C: "Non reversal" portfolio 
 
       Years relative to the reversal year t 
    t-5  t-4  t-3  t-2  t-1  t  t+1 
 
R&D growth – ROE  0.130  0.145  0.141  0.166  0.231  0.250  0.202 
 
Raw returns   0.214  0.222  0.213  0.185  0.180  0.170  0.189 
 
Abnormal returns  0.018  0.015  0.008      -0.005      -0.007  0.001  0.000 
 
R&D growth rate  0.216  0.225  0.234  0.245  0.256  0.240  0.211 
 
Reported ROE  0.086  0.081  0.093  0.079  0.025      -0.010  0.009 
 
R&D-Capitalized ROE 0.113  0.109  0.103  0.093  0.078  0.056  0.060 
 
R&D to sales  0.079  0.094  0.250  0.362  0.704  0.681  0.657 
 
Earnings-to-price  0.085  0.080  0.075  0.068  0.061  0.056  0.054 
 
Book-to-market  0.830  0.800  0.778  0.756  0.736  0.735  0.722 
 
Beta    1.263  1.259  1.257  1.256  1.254  1.229  1.201 
 
Market Capitalization   938   957   979   998   1001   1101   1328 
  
No. of firms   572   632   697   775    868    870    796 
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Table 7 
The Consequences of Earnings Momentum Biases 
Mean coefficient estimates of cross-sectional regressions of monthly stock returns on lagged values of fundamental variables. The returns are for the 
seven years following a given fiscal year over the period 1975-1995. The returns for year 1 are the 12 monthly returns of firm i from the 7th month 
after fiscal year-end, for year 2 are the 12 monthly returns of firm i from the 19th month after fiscal year-end, and so on for year 7. The mean 
coefficients for each year ahead are computed over 252 monthly regressions in the period 1975-1995 (21 years times 12 months per year). T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A:  Benchmark Regression 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t +e i,t+j      
Regressions Intercept Beta Size BM AB E(+)/M E/M 
Dummy 
RDC/M EM bias 
score 
Change in 
EM bias 
score 
Adj. R2 
Year 1 0.0262 -0.0022 -0.0005 0.0029 -0.0004 0.0023 -0.0019 0.0023 - - 0.017 
 (9.846) (-1.764) (-1.269) (3.220) (-0.300) (0.223) (-1.267) (4.500)    
Year 3 0.0159 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0015 -0.0007 0.0151 -0.0006 0.0021 - - 0.01 
 (5.805) (-0.222) (1.159) (1.320) (-0.526) (1.427) (-0.352) (3.984)    
Year 5 0.0220 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0016 0.0106 0.0001 0.0028 - - 0.004 
 (6.095) (0.030) (-0.231) (-1.006) (-0.919) (0.518) (0.046) (3.608)    
Year 7 0.0197 (0.0001) -0.0001 0.0013 -0.0011 0.0115 -0.0004 0.0019 - - 0.002 
 (4.987) (0.013) (-0.121) (0.586) (-0.462) (0.962) (-0.063) (2.874)    
Panel B:  Benchmark regression and the EM bias score variable 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (EM bias score) i,t +e i,t+j      
Year 1 0.0277 -0.0021 -0.0006 0.0030 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0017 0.0023 -0.0020 - 0.017 
 (9.856) (-1.741) (-1.361) (3.333) (-0.263) (0.041) (-1.172) (4.607) (-1.642)   
Year 3 0.0141 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0013 -0.0007 0.0181 -0.0006 0.0020 0.0023 - 0.01 
 (4.936) (-0.170) (1.283) (1.196) (-0.598) (1.673) (-0.411) (3.884) (1.674)   
Year 5 0.0212 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0110 0.0000 0.0027 0.0012 - 0.004 
 (5.590) (-0.004) (-0.205) (-1.092) (-0.928) (0.534) (-0.020) (3.516) (0.69 3)   
Year 7 0.0201 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0011 -0.0018 0.0092 -0.0003 0.0017 0.0008 - 0.003 
 (5.025) (-0.011) (-0.198) (0.468) (-0.792) (0.528) (-0.011) (2.793) (0.762)   
Panel C:  Benchmark regression, the EM bias score, and the change in the score 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (EM bias score) i,t +   
                   c 9,j ( change in EM bias score) i,t  + e i,t+j      
Year 1 0.0275 -0.0021 -0.0006 0.0030 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0018 0.0023 -0.0017 0.0004 0.017 
 (9.577) (-1.736) (-1.341) (3.317) (-0.323) (0.026) (-1.219) (4.573) (-1.108) (0.305)  
Year 2 0.0236 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0011 0.0089 0.0004 0.0019 -0.0013 0.0006 0.013 
 (7.194) (-0.433) (-1.199) (0.556) (0.942) (0.751) (0.256) (3.838) (-0.674) (0.421)  
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Table 7: continued 
Panel D:  Benchmark regression and the EM bias score controlling also for RDG-EM reversals 
 Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (EM bias score) i,t +   
                   c 9,j (EM bias score*Dpn) i,t  + c 10,j (EM bias score*Dnp) i,t  e i,t+j      
Regressions Intercept Beta Size BM AB E(+)/M E/M 
Dummy 
RDC/M EM 
bias 
score 
EM bias 
score*Dpn 
 
EM bias 
score*Dnp 
 
Adj. R2 
Year 1 0.0274 -0.0021 -0.0006 0.0030 -0.0003 0.0009 -0.0017 0.0023 -0.0015 0.0013 -0.0025 0.016 
 (9.799) (-1.664) (-1.403) (3.252) (-0.255) (0.081) (-1.182) (4.524) (-1.128) (0.179) (-1.794 )  
Year 2 0.0241 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0012 0.0092 0.0004 0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0037 -0.0010 0.011 
 (7.366) (-0.419) (-1.260) (0.554) (0.999) (0.774) (0.220) (3.893) (-1.053) (-0.566) (-0.574)  
Panel E: Benchmark regression and the EM bias score variable for positive  to negative reversals only 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (EM bias score) i,t +e i,t+j    
Year 1 0.0320 -0.0010 -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0045 -0.0171 -0.0047 0.0034 0.0046   0.006 
 (5.385) (-0.404) (-0.921) (0.573) (-1.398) (-0.658) (-0.854) (2.925) (0.423)    
Year 2 0.0164 0.0004 0.0001 0.0020 -0.0032 0.0211 0.0087 0.0004 0.0076   0.002 
 (2.411) (0.146) (0.205) (0.795) (-0.933) (0.723) (1.392) (0.342) (0.710)    
Panel F: Benchmark regression and the EM bias score variable for negative to positive reversals only 
Ri,t+j =c0,j +c1,j β i,t +c2,jln(M) i,t +c3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + c 8,j (EM bias score) i,t +e i,t+j    
Year 1 0.0274 -0.0016 -0.0007 0.0039 -0.0022 0.0234 0.0006 0.0013 -0.0070   0.004 
 (4.558) (-0.643) (-1.124) (2.086) (-0.799) (0.909) (0.182) (1.256) (-1.467)    
Year 2 0.0340 -0.0024 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0026 0.0212 0.0040 0.0028 -0.0103   0.005 
 (5.223) (-0.836) (-0.453) (-0.274) (-0.957) (0.690) (0.879) (2.797) (-1.903)    
Notes: 
Ri,t+j= monthly stock returns of firm i, stating with the 7th month after fiscal t year-end, j = 1,…..,84, βi,t= CAPM-based beta of firm i, estimated from 60 monthly stock returns up 
to month t (one month preceding the return calculation); a minimum of 24 months is required, Mi,t= market value of firm i, calculated as price times number of shares outstanding  
at t, the beginning of the returns calculation period, (B/M)i,t= book-to-market ratio of firm i at fiscal year-end, (A/B)i,t= ratio of book value of total assets to book value of common  
equity of firm i at fiscal year-end, [E(+)/M]i,t= ratio of positive earnings to the market value of equity of firm i at fiscal year-end and equal to 0 when earnings are negative, (E/M  
dummy)i,t = 1 if earnings are negative and 0 otherwise, (RDC/M)i,t= estimated R&D capital-to-market value of equity at fiscal year-end, (EM bias score)i,t = scaled decile  
rank of RDGit -EMit constructed by ranking the values of this difference into deciles (0,9) each year t and dividing the decile number by nine so that each firm i takes on a decile  
rank value ranging between zero and one in each year t. The ranking is on an ascending order and thus firms with the most negative RDGit – EMit values are assigned the score of  
zero while the firms with the most positive RDGit - EMit values are assigned the score of 1. Dpn =1 when RDGit - EMit is positive at t-1 but reverses to negative at t, Dnp =1 when 
RDGit - EMit is negative at t-1 but reverses to positive at t.  
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Table 8 
Earnings Momentum Bias Reversal Analysis 
In each year from 1975 to 1995 we detect firms for which the difference R&D growth minus earnings momentum [RDG(5)-EM(5)] reverses. For 
example, for year 1984 we detect firms that had RDG(5)-EM(5) >0 in 1983 but <0 in 1984. This is our "positive to negative reversal" portfolio. We 
also detect firms that had RDG(5)-EM(5) <0 in 1983 but >0 in 1984. This is our "negative to positive reversal" portfolio. The remaining firms 
comprise the "Non reversal" portfolio. We trace these firms five years before and one year after the reversal year. For each of these seven years and 
for each portfolio we report mean values of key characteristics including annual raw and abnormal returns. These returns are for the year following 
the disclosure of the financial statements, i.e. we start the annual return calculation from the seventh month after fiscal year end. The abnormal 
returns are the residuals from the regression: 
R i,t+j = c 0,j + c 1,j β i,t + c 2,jln(M) i,t +c 3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c 4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c 5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c 6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c 7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + e i,t+j.  
We run this regression each year for all firms and we report the mean residuals for the firms that belong to each portfolio.  
 
Panel A: "positive to negative reversal" portfolio 
       Years relative to the reversal year t 
    t-5  t-4  t-3  t-2  t-1  t  t+1 
 
R&D growth – EM      -0.448  1.326  1.157  0.586  3.084      -7.028      -3.048 
 
Raw returns   0.182  0.200  0.247  0.244  0.232  0.180  0.159     
 
Abnormal returns      -0.019  0.013  0.027  0.082  0.070  0.006  0.001    
 
R&D growth rate  0.996  1.450  0.963  0.894  0.719  0.454  0.655 
 
Earnings momentum (EM) 1.443  0.124      -0.194  0.308      -2.365  7.482  3.703 
 
R&D-Capitalized EM 0.289      -0.311  0.399      -1.071      -1.220  2.314  0.054 
 
R&D-to-sales     0.061  0.067  0.147  0.087  0.103  0.109  0.125 
 
Earnings-to-price  0.074  0.062  0.060  0.057  0.049  0.069  0.062 
 
Book-to-price  0.853  0.857  0.837  0.790  0.746  0.697  0.678 
 
Beta    1.190  1.188  1.177  1.157  1.151  1.141  1.124 
 
Market capitalization  1128   1193   1200   1307   1368   1539   1863 
 
No. of firms   90   98   107   119   132   132   123 
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Table 8: continued 
Panel B: "negative to positive reversal" portfolio 
 
       Years relative to the reversal year t 
     t-5   t-4   t-3   t-2   t-1    t   t+1 
 
R&D growth – EM  0.956      -0.507      -0.256      -1.601      -5.817  4.527  0.421 
 
Raw returns   0.304  0.246  0.267  0.151  0.110  0.168  0.176     
 
Abnormal returns  0.090  0.048  0.050  0.003      -0.036      -0.008  0.012    
 
R&D growth rate  0.882  0.903  0.699  0.652  0.622  0.941  0.855 
 
Earnings momentum      -0.074  1.411  0.954  2.252  6.439      -3.586  0.434 
 
R&D-Capitalized EM 0.554  0.545  0.037  0.173  2.481      -0.845  0.762 
 
R&D-to-sales  0.060  0.069  0.057  0.055  0.096  0.140  0.855 
 
Earnings-to-price  0.071  0.066  0.069  0.064  0.072  0.052  0.052 
 
Book-to-market  0.923  0.856  0.799  0.738  0.677  0.724  0.719 
 
Beta    1.207  1.202  1.184  1.177  1.153  1.138  1.109 
 
Market capitalization  1066  1117  1237  1258  1179  1262  1488 
 
No. of firms    81   89   97   105   118   118   107 
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Table 8: continued 
Panel C: "Non reversal" portfolio 
 
       Years relative to the reversal year t 
     t-5   t-4   t-3   t-2   t-1    t   t+1 
 
R&D growth – EM  0.292      -0.063  0.406  0.552  0.787  1.328  0.237 
 
Raw returns   0.174  0.158  0.187  0.128  0.150  0.178  0.165     
 
Abnormal returns      -0.011      -0.012      -0.013      -0.019      -0.007      -0.001      -0.002 
 
R&D growth rate  1.231  1.134  1.150  1.084  1.080  0.838  0.734 
 
Earnings momentum  0.939  1.196  0.744  0.533  0.293      -0.491  0.497 
 
R&D-Capitalized EM 0.670  0.167      -0.114  0.272      -0.165      -0.278      -0.446 
 
R&D-to-sales  0.048  0.054  0.066  0.146  0.245  0.334  0.477 
 
Earnings-to-price  0.079  0.073  0.066  0.059  0.053  0.053  0.052 
 
Book-to-price  0.759  0.764  0.766  0.759  0.738  0.745  0.719 
 
Beta    1.207  1.189  1.181  1.166  1.153  1.141  1.120 
 
Market capitalization  1378   1408   1438   1469   1458   1623   1941 
 
No. of firms   401   437   476   523   578   579   536 
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Table 9 
Simultaneous ROE and Earnings Momentum Bias Reversal Analysis 
In each year from 1975 to 1995 we detect firms for which both differences RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and RDG(5)-EM(5) reverse. For example, for 
year 1980 we detect firms that had RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and RDG(5)-EM(5) >0 in 1979 but <0 in 1980. This is our "positive to negative 
reversal" portfolio. We also detect firms that had RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and RDG(5)-EM(5) <0 in 1979 but >0 in 1980. This is our "negative to 
positive reversal" portfolio. We trace these firms five years before and one year after the reversal year. For each of these seven years and for each 
portfolio we report mean values of key characteristics including annual raw and abnormal returns. These returns are for the year following the 
disclosure of the financial statements, i.e. we start the annual return calculation from the seventh month after fiscal year end. The abnormal returns 
are the residuals from the regression: 
R i,t+j = c 0,j + c 1,j β i,t + c 2,jln(M) i,t +c 3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c 4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c 5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +c 6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c 7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t + e i,t+j.  
We run this regression each year for all firms and we report the mean residuals for the firms that belong to each portfolio.  
 
Panel A: "positive to negative reversal" portfolio 
       Years relative to the reversal year t 
    t-5  t-4  t-3  t-2  t-1  t  t+1 
 
Raw returns   0.135  0.120  0.177  0.313  0.337  0.195  0.164   
 
Abnormal returns      -0.076      -0.093      -0.049  0.102  0.130  0.007      -0.028                          
 
Earnings-to-price  0.104  0.085  0.072  0.069  0.052  0.090  0.075 
 
Market capitalization  866   925   907   984   1180   1292   1492 
 
No. of firms    28    30    31    31    31    31    29 
 
 
Panel B: "negative to positive reversal" portfolio 
 
Raw returns   0.320  0.255  0.327  0.166  0.098  0.141  0.214 
 
Abnormal returns  0.109  0.033  0.125      -0.010      -0.071      -0.026  0.024 
 
Earnings-to-price  0.088  0.088  0.091  0.087  0.099  0.051  0.060 
 
Market capitalization  722   764   875   965   938   1039   1206 
 
No. of firms    29    31    31    31    31    31    28 
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Figure 1 
ROE Bias Reversal Analysis 
Annual Abnormal Returns (AR) are plotted for three portfolios formed based on ROE 
bias reversals. In each year from 1975 to 1995 we detect firms for which the difference 
RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE reverses. For example, for year 1980 we detect firms that had 
RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE >0 in 1979 but <0 in 1980. This is our "positive to negative 
reversal" (PN) portfolio. We also detect firms that had RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE <0 in 
1979 but >0 in 1980. This is our "negative to positive reversal" (NP) portfolio. The 
remaining firms comprise the "Non reversal" (NR) portfolio. We trace these firms five 
years before and one year after the reversal year. For each of these seven years and for 
each portfolio we calculate annual abnormal returns using the residuals of the following 
regression: R i,t+j = c 0,j + c 1,j β i,t + c 2,jln(M) i,t +c 3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c 4,j ln(A/B) i,t +             
c 5,j (E(+)/M) i,t + c 6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c 7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t +e i,t+j.  
These returns are for the year following the disclosure of the financial statements, i.e. we 
start the annual return calculation from the seventh month after fiscal year end. 
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Figure 2 
Earnings Momentum Bias Reversal Analysis 
Annual Abnormal Returns (AR) are plotted for three portfolios formed based on ROE 
bias reversals. In each year from 1975 to 1995 we detect firms for which the difference 
R&D growth minus earnings momentum [RDG(5)-EM(5)] reverses. For example, for 
year 1980 we detect firms that had RDG(5)-EM(5) >0 in 1979 but <0 in 1980. This is our 
"positive to negative reversal" (PN) portfolio. We also detect firms that had RDG(5)-
EM(5) <0 in 1979 but >0 in 1980. This is our "negative to positive reversal" (NP) 
portfolio. The remaining firms comprise the "Non reversal" (NR) portfolio. We trace 
these firms five years before and one year after the reversal year. For each of these seven 
years and for each portfolio we calculate annual abnormal returns using the residuals of 
the following regression: R i,t+j = c 0,j + c 1,j β i,t + c 2,jln(M) i,t +c 3,j ln(B/M) i,t +                
c 4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c 5,j (E(+)/M) i,t + c 6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c 7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t +e i,t+j.  
These returns are for the year following the disclosure of the financial statements, i.e. we 
start the annual return calculation from the seventh month after fiscal year end. 
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Figure 3 
Simultaneous ROE and Earnings Momentum Bias Reversal Analysis 
Annual Abnormal Returns (AR) are plotted for two portfolios formed based on both ROE 
bias and earnings momentum bias reversals. In each year from 1975 to 1995 we detect 
firms for which both differences RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and RDG(5)-EM(5) reverse. 
For example, for year 1980 we detect firms that had RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and 
RDG(5)-EM(5) >0 in 1979 but <0 in 1980. This is our "positive to negative reversal" (PN) 
portfolio. We also detect firms that had RDG/[(RDG/2)+1]}-ROE and RDG(5)-EM(5) 
<0 in 1979 but >0 in 1980. This is our "negative to positive reversal" (NP) portfolio. We 
trace these firms five years before and one year after the reversal year. For each of these 
seven years and for each portfolio we calculate annual abnormal returns using the 
residuals of the following regression:  
R i,t+j = c 0,j + c 1,j β i,t + c 2,jln(M) i,t +c 3,j ln(B/M) i,t +c 4,j ln(A/B) i,t +c 5,j (E(+)/M) i,t +    
c 6,j (E/M dummy) i,t +c 7,j ln(RDC/M) i,t +e i,t+j.  
These returns are for the year following the disclosure of the financial statements, i.e. we 
start the annual return calculation from the seventh month after fiscal year end. 
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